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Preface 
In the final editing of this thesis, I continually stumbled over a question that 
required answering. Why had I picked up on this topic? Why Vietnam? Why 
confidence? The truth is that the topic presented itself to me. In 2005, I left the 
UK for Vietnam to accompany a friend on a week's business, to share a few 
meals and see a few sights. I returned with a diary filled with the scribblings 
and musings that would form the backbone of this work. Instead of relaxing, I 
had found inspiration in a vibrant country that was evolving before my eyes. 
The stories I was told and the scenes that I observed showed a country at a 
turning point, a country that hovered on the edge of success as the world 
watched with bated breath. My exploration of the subject of Vietnam's 
confidence was partly borne from my love of the country and its people and 
the desire to capture the moment between Vietnam beginning to experience 
real success and it securing its place on the world market when it joins the 
WTO. For me, Vietnam's future is wholly based on the confidence of those 
who affect her future; the external parties, her government and her people and 
I feel deeply grateful that I have had the opportunity to be an intimate witness 
to this transition. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Aim, objectives and thesis outline 
This thesis aims to assess the significance of confidence in the development 
of Vietnam's role as an emerging market economy. Confidence in this context 
can be roughly divided into three categories; external confidence (the 
confidence in Vietnam held by other nations and organisations for trade and 
aid), governmental self-confidence (the confidence the government has in its 
own abilities and the capabilities of the nation) and citizen confidence (the 
confidence that Vietnam's citizens have in their government and country). 
The objectives of this thesis meet this aim through; the examination of the 
importance of confidence and the role it will play in Vietnam's political and 
economic future; the assessment of the impact of confidence on the key areas 
of trade, aid, disputes, power, government action, leadership and standard of 
living; collating and analysing primary data on these areas; and the reaching 
of clear conclusions on the role of confidence and suggesting how it may be 
improved and utilised to improve Vietnam's strength on the world market. 
Below is a colonial history of Southeast Asia. It places the nations examined 
in this thesis within an essential context (as the region is a young one 
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regarding independence. 1) It also highlights why Vietnam has been selected 
as the nation studied in this thesis and why confidence has been selected as 
the main focus for this study. 
Chapter two is a literature review of Vietnam's political economy and explains 
how the thesis' aim of assessing the significance of confidence in the 
development of Vietnam's role as an emerging market economy arose from 
the literature. 
Chapters three, four and five each tackle a category of confidence in Vietnam: 
chapter three looks at external confidence, chapter four at governmental self-
confidence and chapter five at citizen confidence. Here, a variety of primary 
sources are used in addition to materials highlighted in chapter two to build on 
the ideas outlined in that chapter. These sources include a number of case 
studies of individuals who live and work in Vietnam in addition to materials 
produced by the Vietnamese government. In addition, chapter four contains a 
case study on China to provide more depth on the subject of governmental 
self-confidence by taking a look at Vietnam's relationship with what is 
arguably her most significant neighbour. 
Chapter six will see the clear expression of conclusions and the presentation 
of recommendations as to how confidence may be improved and utilised to 
improve Vietnam's strength on the world market. 
1 To examine a decolonised nation without regard to its past risks a lack of clear 
comprehension in the complexity of issues, such as trade with former colonial powers. 
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1.2 A colonial history of Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia comprises of the ten countries which make up the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, The 
Philippines, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and 
Myanma,-2. Independence in the region is a relatively recent phenomenon, 
having been subject (with the exception of Thailand3) to various forms of 
colonial rule. 
Lyon identifies three international orders of Southeast Asian history. 4 The first 
he identifies as the Tribute system which required tributary countries to 
recognise Chinese imperial superiority but saw no Chinese intervention within 
those countries. The tributary countries accepted the system as merely being 
the way to trade with China. The second, beginning in the nineteenth century 
saw a change in the attitudes of the European colonial powers from being 
empire orientated (with the focus on traders and missionaries) to being 
focused on territorial ownership whereby countries were to be organised and 
developed. 5 The final order began with Japan's swift take-over from the 
European colonial powers. 
2 Some sources also include East Timor in their list of Southeast Asian countries. 
3 As 80% of capital investment in Thailand in 1940 was British despite it remaining politically 
independent, Lyon describes it as a colonial area in economic terms. Lyon, Peter, War and 
Peace in South-East Asia (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969), p.19 
4 Ibid, p.p.9-20 
5 Sar Desai explains this change as being due to 'the economic needs of the industrial 
revolution', 'Diplomatic rivalry among European powers' and 'the prospect of lucrative trade in 
the interior of China'. Sar Desai, D.R., Southeast Asia - Past & Present (Westview Press, 
Colorado, 1997) p.140 
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Because China's order was non-interventionist, its impact on Southeast Asia 
was less significant than the impact of European colonial powers and Japan in 
terms of shaping the current economic climate of the region. The focus in this 
chapter will therefore be on the European colonial powers and Japan and will 
consider Southeast Asia's decolonialisation and move towards independence. 
Rigg states that the European colonial powers (and many of their 
representatives) considered 'the mere fact that these 'backward' countries 
were being incorporated into the 'civilised' world was a force for positive 
change'. Rigg highlights key benefits and costs; his considered benefits being 
'The construction of modern infrastructure, the provision of schooling and 
health facilities, the extension of Western concepts of justice, and the 
termination of local conflicts' which he states have continued to benefit the 
region. His considered costs to the indigenous population are outlined as 
being 'the manner in which the process engendered dependency, undermined 
local subsistence production, eroded traditional structures, and alienated the 
populations from their own countries. '6 
For Rigg, the debate is ultimately a value judgement with both sides of the 
argument having equal merit. But one has only to read Murphy's 2005 
account of the Vietnamese court process to realise the lack of value in 
importing Western concepts of justice to a country lacking a history of judicial 
structure. 7 It is important not to consider influences merely as good or bad in 
6 Rigg, Joanathan, Southeast Asia: A region in transition (Routledge, London, 1994) p.p.22-23 
7 Murphy records the use of professional witnesses that appeared and reappeared in various 
cases, and stated whatever the party instructed them to say. The reasoning for this was that 
trials are public events, a tool by the party to teach people their civics lessons. Murphy, 
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themselves, but also the significance of their results and while the introduction 
of judicial structures is generally considered to be positive, they can only be 
deemed positive if they are embraced and made use of. 
Clearly one cannot deny certain economic benefits but these must not be 
overstated. The cultivation of new products such as rubber was beneficial until 
Japan cut the former colonial powers from their raw material supply. The 
former colonial powers invested in R&D and found substitutes. This meant 
that the original products lost their value and the regional economy was 
weakened. 
When Japan seized power, she sought support by appealing to local 
populations with slogans such as 'Asia for the Asiatics' and proposals for 'a 
greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere'. This was met with some success but 
any euphoria was short lived as the new regime was soon proven to be little 
different to the colonial rule that had gone before. 8 Japan struggled to 
substitute the former powers and had problems maintaining the colonial levels 
of trade. What was important, however, was that Japan had proven that the 
colonial powers were not invincible and Osborne claims that this was of 
greatest importance, even to those countries with no strong nationalist 
leanings.9 The belief that a country need not bow to western superiority 
increased the confidence of the citizens of those countries and made possible 
the concept of true independence. 
Kenneth, Unquiet Vietnam- A journey to the vanishing world of Indochina (Gibson Square 
Books Ltd, London, 2005) p.p. 56 and 52. 
8 Rigg, Southeast Asia- A region in transition, p.31 
9 Osborne, Milton, Southeast Asia - An Introductory History (St Leonards, Australia, 1995) 
p.135 
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An example of why Japan is often referred to as the catalyst for Southeast 
Asian nationalism can be seen in Indonesia. Osborne states that prior to 
Japanese occupation, 'Indonesian cultural values laid great emphasis upon 
deference and saw ideal behaviour as non-demonstrative and lacking in 
aggression.' The Japanese model of 'admiration of force' and acceptability of 
violence led young Indonesians to question the values of their elders. 10 This of 
course laid further foundations for independence. 
Independence in the Southeast Asian nations was gradual as it was often 
contested by the former colonial powers, who expected restoration. 
Disregarding Thailand (which was never colonised), the Southeast Asian 
nations achieved Independence over a period of 39 years often with Japanese 
encouragement and assistance. 11 The politics that emerged in these newly 
independent states were largely affected by the colonial experience. Case 
explains that with the departure of colonial rulers, 'local leaders and elites 
perpetuated, indeed greatly expanded, the bureaucracies that they inherited.' 
Such bureaucracies had 'introduced powerful state apparatuses, geared 
principally to socio-political controls and resource exploitation.'12 
Vietnam is interesting not only because it was one of the first to be granted 
independence but because that independence was followed by war with a 
western power. While Malaysia had the Malayan Emergency ( 1948-60) 
whereby rebels sought to remove all British from Malaya and Indonesia had to 
10 Osborne, Southeast Asia- An Introductory History, p.141 
11 See appendix 1 
12 Case, William, 'Democracy in Southeast Asia' in Beeson, Mark (ed.) Contemporary 
Southeast Asia - Regional Dynamics, National Differences (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
2004) p.77 
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fight for four years to have her independence acknowledged13, Vietnam was 
subjected to bombing from the United States. 14 The Vietnam or American war 
(depending on your viewpoint) is the most documented subject on post-
colonial history in the region and in considering the current economic climate, 
Vietnam has, perhaps, the most interesting recent history. 
Vietnam's story, as a country free to determine its own destiny, began in 
1975. In many ways, Vietnam is but 31 years old as her government is eager 
to carve out a distinct Vietnamese way of operating rather than follow French 
or Japanese models. Vietnam is positioned between remaining true to her 
socialist ideals and desiring economic success on an international level, 
whether both are possible and whether Vietnam has the confidence to 
achieve them both is the key focus of this thesis. 
Confidence is significant as without external confidence, there would be no 
investors, no aid donors and disputes would be more complex. Pye describes 
early political development theory of the region as being 'overly optimistic' that 
the newly emerging countries would soon become 'effective, modernised 
nation-states' which impacted negatively when the countries failed to live up to 
this expectation. Pye's view is that 'Asians are going to produce their own 
versions of modernisation, which will have their own particular strengths and 
13 Indonesia actually declared independence 16 days before Vietnam (1ih August) but it 
wasn't recognised by the Dutch (the colonial power) until the 27th December 1949. 
14 American involvement in Vietnam has a long history and initially America supported the 
Vietnamese due to their mutual enemy of Japan. But when Ho Chi Minh appealed to America 
after the war to support their commitment to independence, citing the Atlantic Charter and the 
U.N. Charter on self-determination, American foreign policy turned from the liberation of all 
occupied countries and colonies to the postwar anti-communist crusade. This crusade 
required Vietnam's return to French control, an objective attempted by aggressive means. 
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weaknesses,' and rather than be judged against Western standards, should 
be considered 'against more universal models that will overarch the enduring 
gulfs between the world's great civilisations. 15 To a degree this has happened 
and economists now talk of 'Asian Capitalism', as something distinct from 
Westernised capitalism. Western countries are more willing to work with non-
western structures than in the past and it is important that Vietnam gains and 
maintains confidence the confidence of the world. 
Without governmental self-confidence, a country is liable to remain in a post-
war slump. Johnson's book, MIT/ and the Japanese Miracle highlights the 
significance of the policies of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) which enabled the recovery of war ravaged Japan. 16 The Vietnamese 
government's policy of Doi Moi has likewise been an intrinsic part of Vietnam's 
development. 
Citizen confidence is the final edge in this triangle and is both the most 
important and the weakest part. The citizens of a country make that country 
and without faith in their leaders and satisfaction with their standard of living, 
those citizens will make up an unhappy and incompetent workforce. It is 
paramount that their confidence be encouraged. 
15 Pye, Lucian W., Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Massachusettes, 1985) p.p.11 , 343 and 344 
16 Johnson, Chalmers, MIT/ and the Japanese Model (Standford University Press, California, 
1982) Subject of book. 
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2 : Literature Review and Methods 
There is a great wealth of literature on the topic of Vietnam, most of which is 
focused on what the Vietnamese refer to as 'The American War' or 'The 
Resistance War Against America.' Unsurprisingly, the situation frustrates the 
Vietnamese and Luu Doan Huynh's statement in 1999 that 'The American's 
thought that Vietnam was a war. We knew that Vietnam was our country'17 is 
one of many similar sentiments. This chapter seeks to assess the literature 
focused on today's post-war Vietnam, a new, united nation with problems 
more complex than warfare. 
2.1 Vietnam : A political and economic overview 
Nguyen Khac Vien states that 'the history of Viet Nam evolved under the 
combined influence of contradictory factors.' On the one hand was 'a policy of 
economic exploitation and cultural assimilation' and on the other, 'a steadfast 
popular resistance marked by armed insurrection against foreign dominance.' 
It was this resistance he believes that led to 'the preservation of the 
Vietnamese people's identity, the emergence of a national consciousness and 
establishment of the independent state of Viet Nam. '18 Since, Marxism offered 
'an analysis of oppression and exploitation that helped make sense of the 
colonial experience' whilst holding out 'the prospect of fundamental social 
17 Cited in Langguth, A.J., Our Vietnam: the war 1954-1975 (Simon & Schuster, New York, 
2000) Cover leaf 
18 Nguyen Khac Vien, VietNam- a long history (The Gioi Publishers, VietNam, 2004) p.16 
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change,'19 that this new independent state would be socialist, is 
unsurprising.20 
Vietnamese history has its roots in legend and reflects a quest for 
independence. From Hung kings begot of the Dragon Lord of Lac and a 
mountain princess of fairy blood, an area emerged which in 111 B.C. was 
conquered by the Han dynasty (which had recently unified China). Following 
independence in 939, Ly (1009-1225) and Tran (1225-1400) dynasties saw 
Vietnam expand in territory and population, before Vietnam was again seized 
by the Chinese in 1407. In 1427, the invaders were expelled by Le Loi, 
founder of the Le dynasty_21 Under the Le dynasty, two principles emerged: 
the first of Confucianism and Chinese culture; the second of southward 
expansion, known as 'the march to the south', whereby the country expanded 
into the kingdom of Champa (now central Vietnam) and took the Mekong 
Delta (in the south of the country) from the Khmers. Vietnam may have 
overwhelmed the whole of Cambodia had they not been challenged by 
Thailand, and Cambodia being put under a French "protectorate" in 1863.22 
The march to the south allowed power blocs to emerge and the country split 
between the Trinh clan in the North and the Nguyen clan in the South in the 
17th century. In 1771 the Tay Son Rebellion saw rebels begin to gain influence 
over the country and they ruled until their suppression in 1802 by Nguyen Anh 
19 Heywood, Andrew, Political Theory- An Introduction (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 1999) p.275 
20 See Nguygen Khac Vien in his essay, 'Confucianism and Marxism' cited in Bui, Tin, 
Following Ho Chi Minh: the memoirs of a North Vietnamese colonel (Hurst & Company, 
London, 1995) p.xi 
21 Nguyen Khac Vien, VietNam- a long history, p.p.11-59 
22 Church, Peter, A Short History of South-East Asia (John Wiley and Sons Inc., Singapore, 
2006) p.184 
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(of the southern Nguyen clan) who became the emperor Gia Long, the first 
ruler of a united Vietnam for over two centuries. The Tay Son rebels had 
struggled with governing the country and Gia Long found it in administrative 
chaos. He established a capital in Hue and began to organise his country 
according to the Chinese example. But the ensuing bureaucratic intervention 
led to rebellion from the Vietnamese people, and the repression of Christianity 
(which saw thousands of Christian deaths) led to Saigon's seizure in 1859 by 
the French navy. By 1885, France ruled Vietnam through a series of "puppet" 
Nguyen emperors, having conquered what had not already been ceded to it. 23 
The French ruled a divided Vietnam24 relatively securely until 1940.25 It is 
worth noting that Church describes Saigon as having emerged as the 'leading 
and most westernised city in Indochina' and that the French enjoyed greater 
colonial success in Cochin China than Tonkin as it was here that French legal 
reforms were effective. In Tonkin and Annam, indigenous systems were 
favoured as France had no solution to the problems of overpopulation and 
debt, other than industrialisation, a move she was unprepared to take. Cochin 
China, by comparison was sparsely populated and the French were able to 
boast of an increase of 420 percent growth in rice fields on land reclaimed 
from swamps. The value of this is debatable as it led to a poorly balanced 
economy with rice accounting for 70 percent of exports. 26 
23 Church, A Short History of South-East Asia, p.p.184-187 
24 Cochin China (South Vietnam) was administrated from Saigon, Annam (Central Vietnam) 
administrated from Hue and Tonkin (North Vietnam) administrated from Hanoi. 
25 See part 1.2 of chapter one for a consideration of colonialism by European powers. 
26 Church, A Short History of South-East Asia, p.p.187-188 
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The Japanese entered French Indochina in September 1940 and reached the 
agreement that French colonialism would continue. France had just submitted 
to Nazi Germany and the Japanese were predominantly interested in access 
to China in the Sino-Japanese war. Initially the Japanese kept the French 
bureaucracy and leadership in place to run French Indochina but on the 9th 
March 1945, Japan decided to take complete control of French Indochina. 
Japanese seizure of rice and other crops combined with disastrous weather 
produced famine in Tonkin and Annam which set the stage for the Vietminh27 
revolution. Upon Japanese surrender on the 13th of August 1945, Vietminh 
forces took control of northern and central Vietnam but were unsuccessful in 
the south, where they met with opposition who recognised them as ICP 
members. But despite Ho Chi Minh's declaration of Vietnamese independence 
in Hanoi on the 2"d of September 1945, the allies appointed Chinese 
nationalist forces to replace the Japanese in the North. In the south, the allies 
appointed British Indian troops. However, the commander of the British Indian 
troops was so appalled by the political mayhem, he returned Southern 
Vietnam to the French. 28 
War broke out between the French and the guerrilla Vietminh army in 1946 
which swung in favour of the Vietminh in 1950 when fellow communists China 
and then the USSR began to supply the Vietminh with arms. French controlled 
Dien Binh Phu fell in May 1954, signalling the end of French colonisation. At 
the Geneva Conference in July, Ho Chi Minh settled for control of the 
27 Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh: League for the Independence of Vietnam - an organisation 
set up in 1941 as a front for the Indochina Communist Party (ICP). It was led by Ho Chi Minh. 
28 Church, A Short History of South-East Asia, p.p.189-191 
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Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) whilst the South would be 
headed by Bao Dai (former emperor turned nominal chief of state under the 
French). Partition was presumably agreed to because elections were 
promised for July 1956 and Ho Chi Minh was confident of success. 29 The US 
did not approve of the agreement and did not sign the accord. Instead the US 
joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEA TO) in September 1954. 
SEATO consisted of Australia, France, the UK, New Zealand, Pakistan, the 
Philippines and Thailand and aimed to resist the spread of communism in the 
region. 
Rather predictably, the elections never took place- arguably due to US fear of 
a communist outcome. The United States encouraged Ngo Dinh Diem, a 
Catholic and anti-Communist, as prime minister under Bao Dai. Dinh then won 
a referendum to head the south and declared himself president of the 
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and refused to discuss the elections. Agnew 
reduces American intervention in Vietnam to the misguided geopolitical 
assumptions of containment and domino effects, 30 which Galbraith explains 
as the Americans thinking 'let Vietnam fall to this compelling system and the 
rest of Southeast Asia would go. The threat would extend on to India, 
Pakistan and even Africa. '31 Agnew describes America as 'the last domino' in 
this analogy which explains the notion of linkage - that 'Vietnam could be 
understood only in relation to the overarching global conflict'. 32 Opposition to 
29 Church, A Short History of South-East Asia, p.191 
30 Agnew, John, Geopolitics- re-visioning world politics (Routledge, London and New York, 
1998) p.p.4-5 
31 Galbraith, John Kenneth, The World Economy Since The Wars- A Personal View (Sinclair-
Stevenson, London, 1994) p.201 
32 Agnew, Geopolitics- re-visioning world politics, p.27, p.p.4-5 and see p.117 
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Dinh manifested itself into the Vietminh-styled National Liberation Front (NLF) 
which the Americans termed the "Vietcong". Guerrilla warfare ensued and, in 
1975, proved in favour of the NLF. America, Vietnam's last invader, left and 
Vietnam was once again, a united nation. The DRV disbanded the NLF and in 
1976, the country was renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, ruled from 
the North, in Hanoi. 33 
Heywood states that adapting Marxist-Leninist principles, upon achieving 
independence, Vietnam 'moved swiftly to seize foreign assets and nationalise 
economic resources.' Following the Soviet model, a single-party state was 
established with a centrally planned economy. 34 Despite initial confidence, 
Vietnam was to suffer economic crisis borne from reorganisation and natural 
disaster. The 1978 invasion of Cambodia (which removed the Socialist but 
anti-Vietnamese Pol Pot regime) led to confrontation with China and this 
exacerbated the domestic situation which led to the fleeing of the "boat 
people."35 
The Vietnamese situation has improved since 1986 when the policy of Doi 
MoP6 was adopted. This renovation of the economy has led to the United 
33 Church, A Short History of South-East Asia, p.p.191-192 and p.p.194-195 
34 Heywood, Andrew, Political Ideologies - An Introduction (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 1998) 
~p.177 and 155 
There were two groups of boat people (refugees who fled by boat). The first group 
consisted of the Vietnamese who had supported the old government in the south and fled 
after the American war ended, as the new communist government adopted policies of 
sending people to 're-education camps' and 'new economic zones'. The second group 
consisted of ethnic Chinese, who during the Sino-Vietnamese war felt that the government's 
policies directly targeted them. The confidence of these groups is explored in part 5.3 of 
Chapter five. 
36 Doi Moi means economic renovation and was a program launched to reform Vietnamese 
society and stimulate economic growth. Collective farms were dismantled and leaders 
declared their intention to bring about a mixed economy that combined state, collective, and 
18 
States lifting its embargo in 1994, Vietnam joining ASEAN in 1995 (and being 
Chairman in 2001 ), an improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations and the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party in 2004 identifying major tasks in 
the next decade as being 'to privatise state-owned enterprises, to reduce 
poverty ... to maintain political and economic stability and to achieve annual 
economic growth of 8 per cent. '37 
Vietnam is now looking to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The 
Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy in Hanoi said that Vietnam 
and post WTO investment opportunities represented 'a very high confidence 
of what business thinks of Vietnam' but this confidence will only be maintained 
if Vietnam tackles the issues that currently threaten good relations, 
It has to change because they do want to integrate into the world 
economy by membership to the WTO, they do want to play a major role 
in regional affairs, things like ASEAN, and they're hosting APEC, which 
is a huge, huge international summit so it puts Vietnam very much in 
the spotlight and they're aware of that now and they can see the 
benefits for the country, and the country is changing rapidly, it's 
changed a great deal in the three years that I've been here ... there's a 
real sort of groundswell of confidence. 38 
The significance of confidence was not just evident from interviews and 
observations but was soon apparent from the literature I reviewed. There is a 
great wealth of information covering the feelings surrounding Vietnam, for it is 
private ownership. Foreign investment was encouraged, and a more tolerant attitude was 
adopted toward the free expression of opinion in the country. 
37 Church, A Short History of South-East Asia, p.196 
38 Interview, Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy (Hanoi, March 2006) 
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an emotive topic. In addition to the difficulty than surrounds discerning what is 
fact ('Don't pay any attention to anything you read in that. It's complete 
rubbish' I was told as I idly flicked through a copy of the Viet Nam News when 
in the company of an English businesswoman39). 
2.2 Confidence as Vietnam's key issue 
Confidence is introduced in this thesis as a theoretical construct by which 
beliefs and actions in seemingly different areas are examined. The core 
issues relating to Vietnam's political economy were clearly her external 
influences, her government and her people. What was needed was a way of 
exploring the motivations and decisions of these groups. As a researcher, I 
believe that a soft approach to political economy (by which I mean an 
approach that considers these motivations and decisions) can enhance and 
compliment a hard approach (by which I mean the traditional approach of 
looking at figures and statistics). 
Confidence can be defined as 'a feeling of trust in a person or thing: I have 
confidence in his abilities' or 'a belief in one's own abilities; self-assurance. '40 
The key issue when considering confidence, is how to measure it since is 
intangible. It can be used to give reasons for behaviour, for example, 
A stable international monetary system is also dependant on solution of 
the confidence (credibility) problem; other countries must have 
39 Conversation, English Businesswoman (Ho Chi Minh City, April 2005) 
40 WH Smith Editors, Definitive English Dictionary (Aylesbury, HarperCollins Publishers, 1999) 
p.335 
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confidence that the reserve-currency country will not pursue inflationary 
policies leading to devaluation of their own reserves. If they lose 
confidence, other countries will shift the composition of their reserves.41 
Here Gilpin, uses actual measurable behaviour (shifting the composition of the 
reserves) to show the amount of confidence. This is how confidence is 
assessed in this thesis. Examples are given that I feel show the amount of 
confidence held by the relevant party examined in each chapter. 
Thinking about how confidence can be produced, it is worth looking at 
Confidence Building Measures42 which aim to 'lessen anxiety and suspicion 
by making the parties' behavior more predictable.'43 It is the very predictability 
of an action that allows for future planning; an investor that predicts that the 
market will stay open will have greater confidence in investing than if he 
predicted that the market would close again. The idea of Confidence Building 
Measures rests upon a model of positive feedback whereby small increases in 
confidence lead to greater confidence. Thus once Confidence has been 
produced, as long as external influence is limited, it will reproduce. 
Conversely, damage to Confidence can lead to ever lessening Confidence if 
external influence is limited. The provides us with the term Confidence 
Building, the ever increasing Confidence as a result of positive feedback. 
41 Gilpin, Robert, Global Political Economy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001) 
p.p.247-248 
~2 Confidence Building Measures are militaristic and diplomatic agreements, but the way they 
are used and their effects (to increase communication and trust and to reduce fear)make 
them a helpful analogy here. 
43 Maiese, Michelle, Confidence Building Measures 
(www.beyondintractability.orglessaylconfidence_building_measures, Sept 2003, Accessed 
22nd January 2007) 
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As stated above, confidence as Vietnam's key issue was fairly quick to 
emerge from the literature, and it soon fell into the three categories outlined in 
chapter one. The significance of external confidence (the confidence in 
Vietnam held by other nations and organisations for trade and aid) emerged 
from Vietnam being seen as full of opportunity in the mid 1990's but leaving 
investors cautious after numerous problems and Washington's lifting of a 30 
year embargo in 1994. 
The significance of governmental self-confidence (the confidence the 
government has in its own abilities and the capabilities of the nation) is 
evident from Vietnam (as Church states) being a hybrid: 'a state under one-
party control - in theory, socialist - but with a free-enterprise economy 
operating alongside state enterprises.'44 There are many challenges to a new 
nation; the quality of their ministers, uneven trade partners (for instance, 
China is more important to Vietnam than Vietnam is to China) and 
comparative weakness in areas of dispute (such as the Spratly islands). For 
Vietnam, a particular struggle is poor coordination of resources. 
And the significance of citizen confidence (the confidence that Vietnam's 
citizens have in their government and country) is that for the Vietnamese 
government to succeed in achieving the ambitious task of achieving both a 
socialist and a free-enterprise state, they need the confidence of the 
workforce. The Vietnamese people have had such a negative experience of 
government that this area of confidence is perhaps the most important. It is 
44 Church, A Short History of South-East Asia, p.197 
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also perhaps the most difficult to attain as the people undoubtedly care more 
about their standard of living than about socialist ideals. 
The dent in external confidence following from the experiences of investors in 
the 1990's goes some way to explaining how some investors today are 
hesitant. As the Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy in Hanoi 
puts it, 'There are UK companies that 10 years ago got burned here and they 
haven't come back. They've got the scars. '45 Gainsborough describes Vietnam 
in the early 1990's as being 'surrounded by an air of collective euphoria on the 
part of foreign businesspeople, analysts and academics.' He attributes this to 
the achievement of a trade surplus, the 1992 debt agreement with the Paris 
Club and France's President Mitterand's visit in 1993 which 'contributed to a 
new mood of hope' and saw Vietnam declared to be the 'Next Asian Tiger.' 
This led to foreign investment and a rise in economic growth rates. However, 
the mood was short-lived and 'by 1996, unhappy foreign investors were 
swapping tales of double-crossing joint venture partners, infuriating red tape, 
and crippling levels of corruption. '46 
Another important factor reflecting a change in external confidence was the 
lifting of the US embargo as this was indicative of a real shift in US policy. It 
had been understood that following independence from the French colonists, 
Vietnam would require assistance in order to develop. Vietnam approached 
the US and following the rejection of their plea for support, the Vietnamese 
45 Interview, Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy (Hanoi, March 2006) 
46 Gainsborough, Martin 'Key issues in the political economy of post-Doi Moi Vietnam' in 
McCargo, Duncan, Rethinking Vietnam (RoutledgeCurzon, New York, 2004) p.40 
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turned to the Soviet Union.47 America believed that South Vietnam 'could only 
'develop' successfully by imitating the American concept of 'modernity','48 and 
disagreed with the nature of Soviet support. America's solution to this problem 
was to wage war on Vietnam. Despite the failings of their intervention in 
Vietnam, America still holds that it has the blueprint for a successful economy, 
a view which is given strength by America's status. But with growth of 8.4%,49 
Vietnam's socialism is also a viable route to development and while America 
may not fully acknowledge this, she is at least prepared to trade. This 
suggests that America is so confident of the power held in Vietnam's markets 
that she is prepared to overlook matters of politics. 
The main topic for external politics therefore is that of trade. Connected to 
trade is aid as they require similar confidence in how the Vietnamese behave. 
Disputes are also examined under the chapter heading of external confidence 
as their resolution impacts upon both trade and aid. External confidence is 
examined largely through the actions of the external parties since these 
behaviours are indicative of the confidence of those parties. 
Issues regarding the self-confidence of the Vietnamese government largely 
stem from the memoirs of Tin Bui, Following Ho Chi Minh: the memoirs of a 
North Vietnamese colonel. Bui served as a colonel under Ho Chi Minh and 
47 In 2001 Scott stated that 'it is claimed that both Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Fidel Castro in 
Cuba were primarily nationalists who could have been won over to the West, but turned to 
Moscow and to communism in the face of American and western hostility.' Scott, Len, 
'International History 1945-1990' in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve (ed.'s) The Globalisation of 
World Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) p.89 
48 Agnew, Geopolitics- re-visioning world politics, p.p.4-5 
49 Gross domestic product grew 8.4 percent in 2005 (www.bloomberg.com, Accessed 
06/07/06) 
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lays blame for the poor post-war management of resources as being due to 
lacking any system or method. Despite inheriting 'a great quantity of aircraft, 
helicopters, warships, tanks, artillery pieces and just plain guns' including 'so 
much equipment [at the base at Long Binh] that they thought it would take 
fifteen to twenty years to cope with it all', he says that 'we had no idea how to 
manage it. We had no computers, only notebooks and pencils'. 
Soon unit after unit, as well as the military from different regions, were 
coming to ask for equipment. So too were provincial and district 
authorities. There was no proper system for distribution. Much of the 
equipment - uniforms, mosquito nets, tents, water flasks etc. - was 
then sold on the market with the profits going into the pockets of 
corrupt individuals. A lot also disappeared to the North while heavy 
equipment, such as artillery and electronics, was damaged or 
deteriorated though lack of maintenance. So within a few months, Long 
Binh was a worthless shambles 
Bui states that 'it became apparent that all we knew how to do was to destroy 
as we had during the war. We had no idea how to use things constructively 
and how to build' and laments that 'if only we had made good use of all that 
equipment rather than wasting it, maybe the situation would be different 
now.'50 
There are countless examples of similar mistakes. Bui recounts that on the 
30th April 1975, he heard of gold reserves held in Saigon. He told Hanoi and it 
was taken custody of. He says that advice was given by Hao (who 'had been 
50 Bui, Following Ho Chi Minh: the memoirs of a North Vietnamese colonel, p.p.90-100 
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Deputy Premier in charge of economic affairs as well as responsible for the 
National Bank of South Vietnam') to invest the gold in order to finance the 
reconstruction of Vietnam but this was rejected as being capitalist. But when 
he asked Truong Chinh (who served in a number of important offices and 
leadership positions from the 1940s to the 1980s and was an influential 
theorist) a few years later what had happened to the gold, he said it had been 
used to cope with emergencies. In addition to improving resource 
management, the Vietnamese government has got to face its recent history of 
being responsible for 'the death and suffering of tens of thousands of boat 
people who had to endure thirst or attacks by pirates?' and failing to manage 
production levels which led to the people's standard of living falling to 'a pitiful 
level' and saw corruption flourish 'and theft, prostitution and gambling spread 
throughout the whole country!'51 
Trade with China is significant to the self-confidence of the Vietnamese 
government. Templer argues 'whether Vietnam likes it or not, its economic 
fate is inextricably linked to its powerful neighbour.' At the end of chapter four, 
is a case study on the subject of Vietnamese confidence when dealing with 
China and goes into more detail, the complexity of the issue which is 
suggested by the 1995 rice fiasco. 
In 1995, China suffered a shortfall in rice production in its southern 
provinces and began importing large quantities of smuggled rice from 
Vietnam. Although this was illegal, many state firms, even the navy, got 
in on the act of taking rice from the Mekong Delta. Prices soared and 
51 Ibid, p.p.89 and 102 
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farmers, expecting greater profits, planted high-yield, low-quality strains 
that would make them money in the Chinese market. By the time the 
next harvest came around, China had solved its shortage and prices 
plummeted. Farmers were left holding large stocks of poor-quality rice 
that could not be exported anywhere else. 52 
Vietnam was quick to take advantage of what appeared to be an opportunity 
but lacked the ability to realise the situation for what it was. As suggested in 
chapter three, the attitude of the Vietnamese government borders on 
arrogance and overconfident optimism that good things are owed to them. In a 
case such as the rice fiasco, the government ought to make and enforce a 
decision. That the Navy got involved in illegal activity that led to economic 
problems is nothing short of appalling and suggests a lack of either control or 
ethics by the government. 
The main topics concerning governmental self-confidence are power and the 
actions that demonstrate that power. These topics are vast and so the ideas 
concerning powers and actions are then considered through a case study on 
China. This allows greater consideration to be made regarding the confidence 
the Vietnamese government has in its capabilities. 
Bui also has some interesting views on the subject of citizen confidence. He 
viewed citizen confidence as being high during the war 'because they believed 
in the struggle and ultimate victory.' But this was a traditional attitude and 'had 
nothing to do with Marxism, Leninism, socialism or class struggle, as some 
52 Templer, Robert, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam (Little, Brown and 
Company, London, 1998) p.284 
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people dare to say.' But by 1975 the leadership had become 'lax, intoxicated 
and dizzy with victory'. Bui explains that 'most of the top leaders were in their 
sixties and thought increasingly about their families, their children, their homes 
and property. He forgives this saying it's easy to understand, 'They were 
human beings not saints. Few of them could resist the lure of materialism 
because they lacked the education which forms the basis of human dignity. 
Therefore, there was nothing to control them and they let themselves go.' But 
despite his understanding, Bui argues that it was the beginning of Vietnam's 
real cultural crisis. 53 
For citizen confidence to be fully realised, the Vietnamese government must 
relinquish a large degree of control as without it, the economy will never be 
truly open and flexible. Free enterprise is the key to the building of powerful 
economies and if the Vietnamese government does not allow its own citizens 
to fully participate, they are neglecting to utilise what is one of Vietnam's best 
resources. 
Citizen confidence is examined by evaluating the significance of leadership, 
standard of living and growth. These are important considerations for 
appreciating the feelings of the citizens of Vietnam. Unlike external confidence 
and governmental self-confidence, citizen confidence cannot be determined 
through examining actions. Therefore, there is a greater reliance on individual 
accounts and greater speculation than in other chapters. The chapter ends 
with a look at Viet Kieu and Viet Hoa confidence, individuals that belong to 
53 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.98 
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these groups have a different set of values and experiences to other 
Vietnamese people. 
2.3 Methods 
The thesis emerged from a visit to Vietnam in 2005 where I began to be 
interested in Vietnam's development despite her corruption. It seemed that 
there was a route to development that was not incompatible with poor 
governance. Prior to even forming a research question, I began to interview 
the people I met. I asked vague open questions about their lives in Vietnam 
and the work that they did. The individuals consisted of the British Marketing 
Manager I was accompanying and three people that she introduced to me 
during the trip; a hotel manager, a business woman and another English 
woman who was visiting Vietnam. I kept in contact will all of these people 
upon returning to the UK and they provided with invaluable advice and 
support throughout the duration of my thesis. 
During this initial trip I accompanied the British Marketing Manager that I was 
travelling with, to a factory on the outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City and to 
Industrial park offices on the outskirts of Vung Tao. I also made an exploration 
of Ho Chi Minh City alone which included the history museum and a bookshop 
selling books in English. My purchases, combined with my interview notes 
were used to formulate my initial research question: 'Vietnamese Corruption: 
A viable economic model for development?' 
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Upon my return, I contacted Durham University and began my formal 
research. While I had a significant amount of primary data, I soon realised that 
I had little knowledge of Vietnamese history, geography or politics. I began to 
chart a rough history, against which I could make an understanding of my 
primary data. As I began to collect information about the current situation in 
Vietnam, it became apparent that my initial research question was rather 
vague and that there were more significant factors to consider regarding 
Vietnam's economic development. I presented my ideas to my supervisor and 
together we teased out the concept of confidence and the significance of post-
war changes. I then rewrote my research question to the final: 'Confidence as 
a route to Economic Development in Post War Vietnam.' 
I knew that confidence was now the key to my investigation but I needed to 
make the problem precise. I did this by dividing the concept of confidence into 
three categories; External confidence, Governmental self-confidence and 
Citizen confidence. This enabled me to structure my literature review and 
begin forming ideas. The next stage was to return to Vietnam, eleven months 
after my first trip. I knew from previous experience54 that observation is a 
method that works well for me. I set myself a rather vague itinerary with only 
flights, accommodation and a single interview in Hanoi (with the British 
Embassy) planned in advance. This allowed me to follow what caught my 
attention once I arrived. I believe that when in a completely different culture, it 
is not possible to know what you are looking for until you are there. 
54 I had spent ten days in Singapore conducting research for my undergraduate dissertation 
and had found many of my most valuable sources by being open to possibility and visiting 
every interesting location, looking through every interesting book and photographing whatever 
caught my eye. 
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I began my field research in Hanoi where I visited the British Embassy to 
interview the Head of Trade and Industry and where I collected up-to-date 
information on the Unified Enterprise Law and Common Investment Law 
which were to come into force a couple of months after my visit. Also in Hanoi, 
I visited the Vietnam Development Information Centre and made a trip north of 
the city where I interviewed my tour guide. Hanoi also offered me the best 
book shop of the trip and I was able to buy investment guides and 
development reports in addition to several interesting books. I carried my 
camcorder wherever I went and made observations throughout. I also took 
photographs and made notes in my diary. 
My stop in Hue was brief, representing my desire to see the imperial city, 
more than a belief that it would benefit my study. I did not gather any source 
material but in retrospect it was beneficial to view Vietnam from more than just 
it's two key cities. My day in Vung Tao in 2005, trip north of Hanoi and to Hue 
in 2006 have shown me a country beyond it's political and economic centres 
and I only regret that I could not have explored Vietnam further. 
My first reaction to Ho Chi Minh city was one of shock. The drastic 
developments in Ho Chi Minh over the previous year led me to almost feel as 
though I was somewhere else entirely. My camcorder diary is full of 
comparisons between what I was seeing and the city of eleven months earlier. 
Everything from the way the women dressed to the type of shops and 
restaurants was different. 
31 
My methods are unstructured and ad hoc but this is a requisite if one wishes 
to join the society one observes in any way at all. I've learnt more about the 
nature of the Vietnamese people from how they drink coffee55 than I believe I 
could have from a dozen interviews. I have found that the Vietnamese are 
eager to discuss local customs but are reluctant to answer direct questions 
that touch upon the political or economic issues of the day, so it makes sense 
to share a snack, buy a painting and listen to what they have to say, which of 
course covers the material I'd have asked them in a formal interview! 
On the following page is a map showing the locations I visited in Vietnam. 
55 In Vietnam you stir up your own coffee, assemble your own meal and share anything that 
looks good with those you care about. Eating and drinking is serious business to be done in 
company and with utmost care that every mouthful is a delight. You savour every taste, for 
this is the stuff of life. 
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3 : External Confidence 
External confidence relates to the confidence in Vietnam held by other 
countries and organisations. It is examined below under three categories; 
trade, aid and disputes. My research for this chapter was relatively 
straightforward; I conducted interviews with external investors and with the 
head of trade and industry at the British Embassy in Hanoi. There is a greater 
wealth of primary source literature on the topic of external relationships than 
either governmental or citizen feelings and values and so this chapter also 
makes use of material produced in Vietnam for investors. 
3.1 Trade 
Dahm begins his book, French and Japanese Economic Relations with 
Vietnam since 1975, by saying 'with the end of the Cold War the fight for 
power in the world has changed from the political-military field to a race for 
economic power' and the economic competitiveness that has emerged 
between nations has led to a struggle for economic security, seen through 
fights for 'trade shares, export markets, natural resources and investment 
opportunities. '56 Doi Moi has arguably been Vietnam's most important policy 
since independence and economic success now appears to be considered 
more important than socialist ideals. In 1992, new 'official principles' for 
56 Dahm, Henrich, French and Japanese Economic Relations with Vietnam since 1975 
(Curzon, Surrey, 1999)p.1 
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foreign policy were adopted in Article 14 of the constitution produced that 
year. These principles highlighted Vietnam's plans to 'expand its relations and 
cooperation with all countries in the world regardless of political and social 
regime.' Dahm explains this move as resulting from Vietnam's realisation that 
the economic development of her neighbours superseded her own because 
they had superior economic relations with foreign countries. 57 
So what have the Vietnamese done to encourage confidence in Vietnam as a 
trade partner? The most significant move has been the development of 
encouraging trade through modifying the rules and regulations. The Foreign 
Investment Law (FIL), established in 1987 was Vietnam's first legislation to 
regulate trade and essentially opened Vietnam's markets to the world. It was 
part of a movement that Clayton Jones describes as making Vietnam a 
'country of laws- not edicts' Prospective foreign investors were required to 
obtain investment licenses from the State Committee for Cooperation and 
Investment (SCCI) which had complete autonomy in grating licenses and 
preferential treatment. But despite the FIL failing to provide 'bright-light rules 
nor any policy guidelines', it did protect foreign investors against both outright 
expropriation and against some burdensome changes in law.' The Harvard 
Law Review concluded 
In dispute resolution, Vietnam has ignored the current worldwide trend 
towards international arbitration. Vietnam FIL's dispute resolution 
provisions are needlessly restrictive and reflect "traditional attitudes 
which find their justification more in the unfortunate experiences of the 
57 Ibid, p.p.32 and 34 
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past than in the realities of the present and the requirements of the 
future."58 
On the 29th November 2005 the Unified Enterprise Law (UEL) and Common 
Investment Law (CIL) were passed by the National Assembly. These took the 
place of the Enterprise Law (EL), which had regulated domestic investment, 
and the FIL, on the 1st July 2006. The role of the UEL is to 'regulate matters of 
corporate governance, granting a more level playing field than found under 
the current investment regime.' The role of the CIL is to regulate 'access and 
entrance to the market through licensing and registration requirements, and 
conditional sectors of the market.' What this means for investors in Vietnam, is 
the Vietnamese government is now prohibited from a number of 'market 
unfriendly activities' including 'forcing exportation of a percentage of goods 
and services' and 'requiring levels of domestic research and development. '59 
The report states, 
Ensuring that foreign investors will be protected by these unnecessary 
externalities helps keep business operations simpler, more efficient, 
and more productive. Foreign investors will more likely invest in 
Vietnam if their operations respond to market demands, rather than 
government dictations. 
An important clause in the CIL which is a positive indication of development 
law is an article stating 'Investors shall be permitted to invest in all sectors and 
in all industries and trades which are not prohibited by law.' This replaces the 
68 
'Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order: Vietnam. A Case Study', 
Harvard Law Review (Vol. 107, No.8 Jun 1994) p.p.9, 10, 14 and 18 
59 Document provided by the department of trade and industry at the British Embassy in 
Hanoi: 'New Investment Law', p.1 
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previous general principle that allowed investments 'only in areas specified by 
law.'60 
These changes are significant but by no means are the UEL and CIL fully 
comprehensive. What is expected (by the British Embassy in Hanoi) is that 
over a period of time it will mutate into something different through a 
continuous process of updating. This evolution of policy allows for new 
aspects of the law to be added. It is commonly accepted that laws are 
incomplete and those affected accept the situation on faith as ultimately, most 
laws reach an end point which meets the needs of all involved. In the 
meantime, the two documents (or laws) are the basis for dialogue with the 
Vietnamese government to get to that point. Such dialogue occurs at the 
twice-annual Vietnamese business forum where 'the business people throw 
questions at the government and the government responds and they say 
"we'll look into this" and "we'll look into that".' This is a huge development 
which was impossible 20 years ago. 61 
These developments are supported by external bodies. For instance, EU 
capital enabled the creation of Mediaglobe LLC, an organization that works to 
compile and develop business portals in Vietnam. Mediaglobe LLC runs the 
Vietnam Trade Catalogue which lists the trade products of Vietnam and 
provides valuable contact details for organisations that meet a wide range of 
trade partner needs. The Vietnam Trade Catalogue lists the following products 
as trade subjects on its database: Beverages, Chemicals, Clothing, Consumer 
60 Document provided by the department of trade and industry at the British Embassy in 
Hanoi: 'New Investment Law', p.p.2 and 3-4 
61 Interview, Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy (Hanoi, March 2006) 
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Goods, Foodstuff, Fuels, Furniture, Jewellery, Machines (equipment), 
Manufactured goods, Medical products, Office equipment (supplies) Pet 
Stuff2, Porcelain (sanitary wares), Textile products and Vietnam traditional 
crafts. 
This list is sub-categorised, providing company details for each category. For 
instance, the sub-category of Ceramics, listed under Vietnam traditional crafts 
lists the organisation, Hoan Thanh Pottery Private Enterprise. The Hoan 
Thanh Pottery Private Enterprise boasts 400 employees, markets to France, 
Germany, the UK, Sweden, Holland, Japan and the USA. The company states 
it's mottos of 'Prestige', 'Quality', 'Good price' and 'On time delivery' and is 
clear about its interest for new business. 53 This quality of information reflects 
the development of "Vietnam Inc." to a sophisticated and capable trade 
location. There is some way to go and Mediaglobe LLC do not claim a 
situation that differs from the information provided by the British Embassy 
below, but the structures are increasingly in place for the continuing 
improvement of relationships between investors and Vietnamese 
organizations. 
However, concepts such as the Vietnam Trade Catalogue must not be 
overstated. The site has some glaring omissions (while trade is claimed to be 
done in 'Chemicals', no companies are listed) and company statements are 
not verified.64 The experience of many investors is that Vietnamese 
62 Pet Stuff is the term used by the Vietnam Trade Catalogue to describe animal feed, 
veterinary medicine, animal husbandry and the construction of farms. 
63 The Vietnam Trade Catalogue (www.info.vn, Accessed ?'h August 2006) 
64 The Vietnam Trade Catalogue (www.info.vn, Accessed ?'h August 2006) 
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organisations will readily agree to all standards of production in order to gain 
contracts but then struggle to meet these standards. 65 For the Vietnamese 
Trade Catalogue to be more efficient some proof of checks upon its listed 
companies is necessary. 
But the capability is there, Vietnam is increasingly capable of supporting 
ambitious enterprise projects. FPT, the 'top IT and Telecoms group, with an 
annual growth of 40%, an annual revenue of $500 million, and some 5,000 
employees' enables companies such as the NTT-IT Corporation of Japan to 
have their expectations 'exceeded' in the 'progress and development of 
projects. '66 However, the surge on the 220V electricity is such that visitors are 
warned against using sensitive electronic equipment (such as laptops)67 and 
bare electricity cables can be seen sparking throughout the country. 68 This 
dichotomy risks reducing confidence in Vietnam's technological capacity and 
needs addressing. 
The relationship between investors and Vietnamese organizations has a 
number of problems with quality control being one of the most significant for 
small scale trade. Vietnamese goods are described as ugly and of poor quality 
by the Chinese, a common complaint made of Vietnamese manufacturing. 
Christina Yu, the Hong Kong lawyer who owns the Hanoian handbag labels 
lpa Nima and Tina Sparkles wished to 'merge Vietnamese ideas with western 
65 1nterview, British Marketing Manager (UK, April 2006) 
66 FTP: Connecting Vietnam with IT Excellence with quotes from Shigeki Masaki, the Director 
of BC Business Section, NTI -IT Corporation of Japan (Heritage Magazine, March/April 2006) 
~p.SO and 51 
Need to Know (Heritage Magazine, March/April 2006) Section 2: Window on Vietnam, p.4 
66 Viewed by author throughout Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City in March 2006. 
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design to create an exportable high-quality fashion accessory item.' She felt 
that Vietnamese work needn't be considered low quality with manufacturers 
aiming no higher than the low and middle market. As a foreigner, she valued 
the skills of the Vietnamese workforce and believed that her employees could 
learn the process of production and develop the ability to create new designs. 
But she found it difficult to communicate the importance of originality, 
business ethics and long-term planning. 59 
This notion of persuading the Vietnamese to look beyond their own lives is a 
big difficulty in a country with controlled media. The marketing manager of a 
British garden ware manufacturer was often exasperated at the workers and 
factory owner of a site near Ho Chi Minh which produced pots for the 
company. To the Vietnamese, a pot was a container, to the marketing 
manager, a pot sold by her company was a thing to contribute to a stylish 
lifestyle. She repeatedly tried to communicate the importance of the pots 
being free from chips and cracks and regularly demonstrated the paint effect 
required but to little avail and ultimately her fees and the expense of repainting 
in the UK meant that the relationship was not viable. 70 
For larger scale trade, problems tend to be found when negotiating 
Vietnamese business structures71 , and as a result the British Embassy in 
69 Scott, Pam, Ufe in Hanoi- Local and expat stories in Vietnam's capital (New Holland 
Publishers, Sydney, 2005) p.90 
70 Interview, British Marketing Manager (Ho Chi Minh City, April 2005) and Factory Visit 
~Outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City, April2005) 
1 This is not necessarily true for smaller enterprises. Scott cites Bret, the owner of a 
mechanical and electrical contracting business, as saying: 'There is no easy way to build a 
business. If I tried to do it in Australia I would have got killed with rules and insurance and 
taxes. Over here it is the same thing but you are allowed to gradually follow the rules, you are 
given time to improve and each month we do, like buying insurance or something.' Scott, 
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Hanoi does not promote the Vietnamese market to small or inexperienced 
companies. As the head of trade and industry succinctly put it, 
UK trade and investment is very much focused on SMEs- how to help 
and make SMEs more competitive in the world of world exports but 
there are certain markets around the world where a small, medium 
enterprise or a first time exporter would just not go there because 
they'd just be cut to ribbons. This is one of those markets. 
Despite vast interest, the embassy stresses that it's very slow to do an 
investment project in Vietnam. It took British Petroleum (BP) 12 years to do 
their deal, 'it is a market for people that have the time and resources to 
actually make a go of it.' But the rewards are great and UK investments (such 
as BP, Shell, Stanley and Carter, and the UK division of HSBC) are big 
players. Finley Teas (investment in tea plantations) are described as being 
'here for some time and they are actually developing and expanding on their 
initial investments. So that's a positive sign that the investors are not pulling 
out. They're actually developing their own businesses. That's a good thing.'72 
A good example of negotiation of Vietnamese structures is the Japanese 
Television series, Oshin. To a degree, countries wishing to trade with Vietnam 
must take some responsibility for the understanding of their products and 
Japan has been portrayed as a 'modern and moral nation', in part due to the 
careful campaign of the series. Oshin is 'a serial that depicts the harsh life and 
struggles of a village woman in nineteenth-century Japan. 'All the young and 
old in my family watch Oshin because for the older ones it reminds them of 
Pam, Life in Hanoi - Local and expat stories in Vietnam's capital (New Holland Publishers, 
Sydney, 2005) p.1 04 
n Interview, Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy (Hanoi, March 2006) 
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when life was so difficult here, while for the younger ones it explains how 
things used to be', said Nguyen Thi Mai, a secondary school teacher.' 'Oshin 
was useful in improving Japan's image and dispelling myths about a country 
that until recently had very few links with Vietnam since its troops were there 
during World War II. 'The first thing the Vietnamese think of when they see 
Japanese people is money, so it's good for them to see in this programme 
that we weren't always rich and that things were difficult for us once', said a 
Japanese businessman. '73 
Another successful approach has been the formation of joint ventures. Beer is 
an interesting example here. Previously Vietnamese beer was named simply 
for its place of origin and most cities had a distinct beverage. Sterling notes 
that the demand for beer on the rise among tourists and the newly affluent of 
Vietnam in recent years has led to Vietnamese/foreign joint ventures. The Red 
Horse brewery of Nha Trang has enjoyed the investment of capital and 
expertise from San Miguel of the Philippines, Fosters of Australia is now 
associated with Biere Larue and Huda beer from Hue is made with Danish 
technology. 74 
Yet, in the shadows of the success stories is one of corruption. The 
Vietnamese government creates structures to regulate and control but the 
problem lies with enforcement. The main role for the Trade and Industry 
department at the British embassy is lobbying for transparency and 
bureaucracy. Tenders are regularly out of line with international regulations 
73 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.343 
74 Sterling, Richard, World Food Vietnam (Lonely Planet Publications, Victoria, Australia, 
2000) p.60 
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and the head of the department describes the situation by saying it's 'all very 
misty with things happening behind closed doors.' For example, a British 
company and a Chinese company were bidding for a contract. During the 
process there were a number of criteria which the bidders had to meet. The 
UK company met all of those criteria while the Chinese company didn't even 
meet the key criteria yet still won the contract. It's essential that the 
Vietnamese move away from this kind of behaviour as it is incredibly off-
putting to western organisations. The Head of Trade and Industry at the 
embassy talked about huge projects being abandoned after they were 
approached 'in the wrong way' and offered ease of business in return for 
something. The majority of western companies feel compromised and lack 
confidence in the regulatory organisations to protect their interests. 75 
This is perhaps the final hurdle for external confidence regarding trade with 
Vietnam. Corruption is a sensitive topic and the use of the word is often 
limited to 'the C word.' Yet by historical comparison, the Vietnam of today is 
capable of fulfilling the needs and desires of trade partners. Mr Fook, the 
minister for planning and investment gave a speech at the Euro Money 
Conference in Hanoi in March 2006 where he said, 'For the past few years 
Vietnam has been taxiing to the runway and now Vietnam stands at the end of 
the runway.' The Head of Trade and Industry recounted this and added, 
'They're ready for takeoff. '76 There are companies that got burned in the mid 
1990s and may never return, but Vietnam is not shy of interest and while the 
75 Interview, Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy (Hanoi, March 2006) 
76 Interview, Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy (Hanoi, March 2006) 
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UELand CIL will need adapting, the structures that will secure the confidence 
of the world market are in place. 
Below is a chart showing the increased trade in goods and services between 
Vietnam and other countries and the change in FDI. The peak in FDI in 1996 
can probably be attributed to Vietnam opening her markets that year and the 
tailing off may reflect the problems with red tape and corruption discussed 
above. Unfortunately, figures are slow to emerge from Vietnam and the recent 
upturn in FDI mentioned by the Head of Trade and Industry and the British 
Embassy in Hanoi, cannot be see yet. 
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3.2 Aid 
Pye describes the Vietnamese relationship with aid in the 1970's as 
delusional, saying that they believed $7 billion in foreign assistance (that could 
fund a five-year plan outlined at the Fourth Party Conference in 1977) was 
conceivable. The Vietnamese government was 'trumpeting the questionable 
slogan, "We have friends everywhere in the world",' and the serious decision-
makers seemed to believe their own propaganda. Pye attributes this na·ive 
ambition to 'an exaggerated sense of importance' that was so divorced from 
reality that during secret talks in 1978 with Richard Hoi brooke, 77 Hanoi 
became 'caught up in a complex game of diplomacy' that became increasingly 
ridiculous as negotiations continued. 
The Vietnamese hoped that they could establish relations with Washington 
before normalisation occurred between Washington and Peking.78 But their 
absurd tactic included their persistence in 'demanding that "in return" for 
establishing formal relations Washington should pay Vietnam $2 billion.' This 
may have been a possibility at one point as the figure had been mentioned 
during the Paris Peace Accords of 1973 but Hanoi had violated these accords 
in 1975 and it was unfeasible to imagine that a United States Congress would 
77 Holbrooks was America's assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs and 
was committed to the 'well-intentioned but strategically questionable policy of achieving early 
normalisation with Hanoi, or at least of preventing relations from descending into the deep 
freeze, as they had done with China during the previous twenty years.' Pye, Asian Power and 
Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, p.241 
78 America had initially refused to recognise China due to her communist administration and 
vetoed her entry to the UN. America's view of China worsened when Mao gave support to 
North Korea and North Vietnam. However, she allowed China to join the UN Security Council 
(and denying Taiwan) in 1971. The Chinese huge consumer market was appealing to 
America and China wanted access to western markets and capital and both countries were 
keen to build economic relations despite their ideological difference. 
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still vote such a sum. 79 Hanoi, somewhat predictably, dropped the demands 
shortly after President Carter announced Washington's readiness for 
normalisation with Peking by the end of 1977 but 'by then it was too late.'80 
Then, just two years later, Templer states that Vietnam damaged relations 
with China by 'churlishly' suggesting that the aid they received during the war 
amounted only to 'some light weapons and a little food' when in fact China 
had sent 'thousands of advisors' and given 'the equivalent of $20 billion in 
aid'.81 It is understandable that the Vietnamese felt unhappy about the 
Chinese attitude to aid, since China had also provided aid to the Pol Pot's 
anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge but it reflects badly on the integrity of a 
government when the truth is denied. 
Vietnam's definition of what is reasonable to expect when it comes to aid 
seems somewhat misguided. Bui describes communist propaganda as being 
'good at painting one-sided pictures' that don't show the real problems and 
describes the government of the 1970s as being 'ignorant in our arrogance. '82 
Aid was expected but how much and the nature of the delivery was something 
the government seemed to know little about. 
When the US House of Representatives voted to freeze non-humanitarian aid 
to Vietnam unless Hanoi improved its human rights record in 2004, communist 
79 The Peace Accords, signed on the 2th January 1973, officially ended direct U.S. 
involvement in the Vietnam conflict, although they allowed for financial and limited military 
support to enable South Vietnam to support herself (a promise that President Nixon soon 
broke anyway). Vietnam violated the accords by not withdrawing from Laos as agreed. 
80 Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, p.241 
81 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.288 
82 Bui, Following Ho Chi Minh: the memoirs of a North Vietnamese colonel, p.p.BB and 89 
46 
party newspaper Nhan Dan called it "an unfriendly act" and claimed it 
counteracted efforts to normalise "diplomatic, political and economic relations" 
between the two countries. An editorial added that American behaviour during 
the Vietnam War meant that America had no right to judge. 83 This retort 
makes the Vietnamese government sound like a petulant child that believes is 
entitled to the aid by right. To the detached observer, little progress appears to 
have been made from the grandiose plans of 1977 when aid was also 
expected. 
Vietnam is one of Denmark's biggest receivers of development aid but after 
the current agreement expires in 2010, this will be cut considerably. The 
Danish minister of development cooperation suggests this is a positive step, 
saying 'our success is driving us out of Vietnam, you could say.' 
All the main figures show how much progress Vietnam is making. The 
economy is improving, the conditions for the population is improving, 
more and more children are starting school, all in all Vietnam is a 
country in such rapid progress that we have decided to down-size our 
efforts in the country ... Our presence in Vietnam has first and foremost 
been about fighting poverty. When we now see that it has worked- at 
least in parts of the society. 
Poverty reduction is in part attributed to foreign companies establishing 
themselves in the cities and as a result, rural areas are still underdeveloped, 
83 US Votes to Cap Vietnam Aid (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3909013.stm, 20th 
July 2004) 
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hence the reduction rather than cessation of aid. 84 However, it will be 
interesting to see the Vietnamese response to this lowering of funds. 
It is important to note that aid can take the form of diplomatic support. Dahm 
explains that despite the US embargo had France maintained diplomatic 
relations with Vietnam and continued to give humanitarian aid after she 
invaded Cambodia. Her limited dependence on American markets enabled 
this move when other nations fell to US pressure. However, while France 
continued bilateral relations, she was unable to reintroduce Vietnam to the 
world market. It wasn't until 1993 when President Clinton ended US 
opposition to refinancing Vietnam's debt that 'the implementation of a French-
led proposal to refinance Vietnam's US$ 140 million debt' was allowed. This 
was significant because 'in order to qualify for fresh loans from the IMF, 
Vietnam first had to discharge its debt, accumulated before its suspension 
from the IMF in 1984.' US$55 million of the debt was paid by a group of 
'friendly countries' headed by France with the remainder financed by a US$85 
million bridging loan. Vietnam immediately qualified for a US$85 million loan 
from the IMF to pay back America. 85 This diplomatic support was essential for 
Vietnam's economic recovery. 
84 Broegger, Thesis, Denmark to Cut Vietnam Aid in Four Years (www.scandasia.com, 
Accessed 51h July 2006) 
85 Dahm, French and Japanese Economic Relations with Japan since 1975, p.44 
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3.3 Disputes 
The way disputes are handled says more about a situation than the actual 
events. Because Vietnam was defined as Communist, as a communist state, 
she was subject to suspicion. In December 1978, Vietnam intervened in 
Cambodia where a large number of human rights were being violated. 
Wheeler and Bellamy state that a lack of collective intervention had led to 
Vietnam taking the law into her own hands. Vietnam did not claim to intervene 
on humanitarian grounds, but argued self-defence - 'the legitimate right of all 
states under Article 51 of the UN Charter.' Vietnam was 'castigated and 
sanctioned' for acting as 'an agent of Soviet Imperialism' while Tanzania, who 
had intervened in a similar way in Uganda a few weeks later received no 
'public denunciation' arguably due to Tanzania's intervention in Uganda being 
less involved in Cold war geopolitics. 86 
In the brief period between independence and the invasion of Cambodia, 
Vietnam was viewed relatively positively by ASEAN, 87 particularly Malaysia, 
whose leaders had spent the previous decade criticising American 
intervention in South Vietnam. Pye describes them as being 'the most inclined 
to think well of Hanoi's leaders, and the most anxious for peace and 
tranquillity throughout the region.' Malaysia had advocated making Southeast 
Asia a zone for "peace, freedom, and neutrality," and had encouraged the 
86 Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Bellamy, Alex J., 'Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics' in 
Baylis, John and Smith, Steve (ed.'s) The Globalisation of World Politics (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2001) p.p. 478-479 
87 ASEAN at this time only consisted of the five founder members: Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. Brunei joined in 1984, followed by Vietnam in 1995, 
Laos and Burma in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. 
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other ASEAN members to reach out to Vietnam. Malaysia was therefore, 
shocked and disappointed at Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia.88 The 
shock was possibly less for the other members, for Hanoi had rejected the 
proposal of a zone for "peace, freedom and neutrality" preferring the values of 
"peace, independence and neutrality." Hanoi objected to the term freedom 
due to it contradicting their human rights violations feeling that the concept of 
independence as the opposition of all foreign military bases in Southeast Asia 
was preferable. This concept of independence was not held as a value by the 
ASEAN members. 89 
The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia also damaged her relations with the 
UN, whose General Assembly refused to recognize the Vietnamese supported 
government in Phnom Penh and demanded withdrawal followed by free 
elections. The situation was one of the reasons for the 1979 border war with 
China. Within the sphere of political disputes, the example of Cambodia is a 
good one as it saw Vietnam conduct relationships with ASEAN, the UN and 
China. 
After removing Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge government, the Vietnamese instated 
their 'puppet' government, the People's Republic of Kampuchea90 (PRK). The 
PRK had to fight the Chinese supported displaced government to maintain its 
control of the country. A treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1979 
led to Vietnamese migration in the early 1980s but this appeared more to be 
88 Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, p.248 
89 The US library of Congress, Country Studies- Vietnam- ASEAN (www.countrystudies.us) 
Accessed 11/08/06 
90 Kampuchea is the local tem for Cambodia and is an abbreviation of Preahreacheanachakr 
Kampuchea. 
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due to establishing a Vietnamese friendly regime and developing an 
Indochinese community under Vietnamese hegemony than about 
colonization. ASEAN joined China in supporting the displaced government. 
ASEAN's position on Cambodia was important to Hanoi, because it was 
through ASEAN's efforts at the UN that the world's attention continued to 
focus on Cambodia in the late 1980s. The Vietnamese thus saw ASEAN as 
having the power to confer upon them or to deny them legitimacy in 
Cambodia. Vietnamese diplomats sought to convince the ASEAN countries 
that the invasion of Cambodia was intended to eliminate the threat posed by 
Pol Pot's alignment with China. Rather than have its activity in Cambodia 
perceived as potentially damaging to ASEAN's security, Vietnam wanted to 
assure ASEAN members that it was in the group's interest to join with 
Vietnam in countering the Chinese threat to the region. Cultivating goodwill 
with key ASEAN members was an important part of this strategy. 
The extreme brutality of the Khmer Rouge's reign did mean that ASEAN was 
concerned for the possibility of their involvement lessening the international 
appeal of the anti-Vietnamese cause. To enhance the perception of the anti-
Vietnamese campaign, ASEAN influenced the formation in 1982 of a coalition 
(the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea or CGDK) which 
apparently diminished the Khmer Rouge's political role. Together with the 
Khmer Rouge, the coalition consisted of two non-communist organizations, 
the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the Armee 
Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS). These non-communist elements added 
legitimacy to the coalition and soon began receiving Chinese arms. ASEAN 
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was also instrumental in preventing the Vietnam-sponsored Heng Samrin 
(leader of the PRK) regime in Phnom Penh from taking over Cambodia's UN 
seat. 
Between 1982 and 1987 the Vietnamese launched annual campaigns on base 
camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. In 1986 the coalition began tactics 
to increase their military effectiveness in Cambodia's interior. This prevention 
of Vietnam from securing the whole country led to a stalemate situation. The 
Vietnamese remained firm as they valued the perceived national security 
higher than the costs of upholding it. Various moves were made in the late 
1970s and early 1980's to improve relations between Vietnam and various 
ASEAN members. In 1978 Vietnam and the Philippines had agreed to 
negotiate but failed to settle their conflicting claims to the Spratly lslands91 . 
Foreign Minister Thach, during a visit to Indonesia in 1982, took a conciliatory 
position in discussing Vietnam's and Indonesia's competing claims to the 
Natuna lslands92 , and in 1984 Hanoi made a similar gesture to Malaysia in 
order to help resolve their conflicting claims over Amboyna Cal3. It became 
apparent however, that ending the war in Cambodia remained the key to any 
further resolution of differences between Vietnam and ASEAN. 
In December 1987 and January 1988 France hosted the first substantive 
negotiations between the factions. This led to a month-long international 
91 Also called the Nansha Islands (by the Chinese), the Spratly Islands are in the South China 
Sea, a body of water that the Vietnamese insist should be called the East Sea. 
92 The Natuna Islands are a 272-island archipelago in Indonesia. They are located in the 
Natuna Sea between east and west Malaysia. The importance of these islands is explored in 
~art 4.3 of chapter four. 
Amboyna Cay is located near the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea. 
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conference on Cambodia held in Paris during August 1989 where France was 
instrumental in the process of negotiation. Vietnamese troops then left 
Cambodia. In October 1991, the third conference on Cambodia brought about 
the signing of a peace treaty in Paris. 94 
Areas of territorial dispute that remain between Vietnam and other Southeast 
Asian Nations are both on land and at sea. There are issues of border 
demarcation with all of Vietnams neighbouring countries. Despite maritime 
boundaries and fisheries agreements with China in the Beibu Gulf,95 land 
boundaries still proceed slowly between the two nations. Part 4.3 of chapter 
four looks into the relationship between Vietnam and China in greater detail. 
The Cambodians and Laotians meanwhile complain of Vietnamese squatters 
and armed encroachments along their borders despite agreements with Laos 
in 2004 and Cambodia in 2005 seeing agreements on the subject of boundary 
markers. Tensions were increased as the spread of Avian Flu has led to 
Vietnamese borders being watched. The establishment of a maritime 
boundary with Cambodia was hampered by an unresolved dispute over 
offshore islands while Vietnam also contests ownership of the Paracel Islands 
(occupied by China and also claimed by Taiwan) and the Spratly Islands (also 
claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan with Brunei, Malaysia and the 
Philippines also claiming various parts). The 2002 "Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea" has eased tensions in the region 
94 Dahm, French and Japanese Economic Relations with Japan since 1975, p.45 
95 Also called the Gulf of Tonkin, Beibu Gulf is a semi-enclosed sea east of northern Vietnam, 
south of mainland of China and west of the Chinese island of Hainan. The issues surrounding 
the area are explained in more detail in part 4.3 of chapter four. 
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but falls short of a legally binding "code of conduct" desired by several of the 
disputants. 96 Yet despite the tension surrounding the situation, actual action is 
minimal and all parties have stated their desire for peace and cooperation. 
One route that Vietnam has taken towards peace with her neighbours came 
towards the end of the 1990s when the Vietnamese government realised the 
benefits of using Confucianism as a way to build ties with other Asian nations. 
This has been effective with South Korea with whom Vietnam shares a history 
of hostility. Instead of looking at the brutality of the American war, where 
South Korean troops fought alongside the South Vietnamese, emphasis is put 
on more ancient history. Vietnam and South Korea had both sent envoys to 
pay tribute to the imperial court in China and Templer describes the 
ideological gulf between the countries as being 'bridged by fictive bonds of 
Confucianism and ancient ritual. '97 
Today, Vietnam's stance on foreign policy is much the same as it was after 
the American war. The values of "peace, independence and neutrality" have 
been superseded by those of "peace, national independence, democracy and 
socialism." The Vietnamese government claims that these values are sought 
by the whole world. Peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia and the rest of the 
world is declared to be the prior goal. 98 
96 The CIA Factbook (https:/lwww.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/vm.html, Accessed 
20th July 2006) 
97 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.292 
98 Nguyen Phu Trong, VietNam on the path of renewal (The Gioi Publishers, Hanoi, 2004) 
p.p.?-8 
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Of course not all disputes are focused on territory, the resolution of business 
disputes is vital for successful trade. It is essential for investors to have faith 
that any areas of conflict between themselves and Vietnamese parties will be 
dealt with impartially and fairly. The New Investment Law, comprising of the 
UEL and CIL (mentioned in part one of this chapter), covers the subject as 
part of the new business initiative. A carry over from the old laws99 is the 
choice of foreign courts or arbitration for disputes between foreign investors 
and Vietnamese parties but there has been a change in respect to dispute 
resolution: 
Disputes between foreign invested enterprise (considered local entities) 
and State administrative bodies or Vietnamese parties, may be 
resolved not only through Vietnamese arbitration or a Vietnamese 
court, but by an international arbitration body in some cases. 
International arbitration must be written into a contract with the State or 
Vietnamese party, or be stipulated in an applicable trade treaty with 
Vietnam. This should give foreign investors more confidence when 
doing business with Vietnamese partners, especially the government, 
provided they have strong dispute resolution clauses in their contracts. 
However, the British Embassy states that 'there is cause to believe this clause 
is a drafting error, since according to the Civil Procedure Code disputes rising 
from implementation of a contract fully in Vietnam, will be subject to 
Vietnamese jurisdiction.'100 If this is the case then, the methods employed by 
the Vietnamese courts will need to meet very high standards for transparency 
99 The "old law" refers to the EL and FIL that were replaced by the UEL and CIL on the 181 
July 2006. 
100 Document provided by the department of trade and industry at the British Embassy in 
Hanoi: 'New Investment Law', p.7 
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and justice for investors to have confidence in the protection of their 
investment. 
3.4 Summary 
Within the context of trade, external confidence has increased significantly 
since the emergence of Doi Moi. Doi Moi reflects Vietnam's desire to 
encourage trade partners and stems from the realization by the Vietnamese 
government that other Southeast Asian nations attributed their success to 
positive economic relations. The Vietnamese continue to increase confidence 
by developing laws that support trade, such as the UEL and GIL. Concepts 
such as the Vietnam Trade Portal further enhance the image that Vietnam 
portrays to the outside world. 
However, there are problems beyond the Vietnamese government's capacity 
for jurisdiction. Issues of quality can only be resolved by the relevant members 
of the workforce yet impact on confidence in trade partners as a whole. 
Likewise, the difficulty of working with business structures and the 
government's inability to curb corruption, both damage confidence in the 
integrity of Vietnamese partners. Yet Vietnam is a still a desirable trade 
partner, as reflected in the campaigning by the Japanese to build confidence 
in them, and the popularity of joint ventures. 
Confidence within the context of aid is more complex as by its nature, the 
donor recognizes weakness in the recipient country. The greatest confidence 
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concerning aid in Vietnam stems from France's faith when Vietnam was 
abandoned by other donors. That aid has been beneficial can be seen by 
Denmark's withdrawal. Denmark is clearly confident that Vietnam can cope 
with increasingly less help. 
Vietnam's overarching goal has always been claimed to be peace, especially 
in the Southeast Asian region. There was reasonable justification for the 
intervention in Cambodia, reflected in ASEAN's need to add legitimacy to the 
anti-Vietnamese force by the creation of a coalition to defuse Khmer Rouge 
influence. However, the desire for control of the Paracel and Spratly Islands 
cannot be reduced to such honourable motives. 
Diplomatic relations with South Korea that make use of shared Confucian 
history are a creative and mature response to the need for a working 
relationship in the face of a brutal history. Equally, taking the need for dispute 
resolution within the sphere of business shows a realization of the importance 
of increasing confidence in Vietnam as a reliable and responsible world 
player. 
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4: Governmental self-confidence 
Governmental self-confidence relates to the confidence the government has in 
its own abilities. It is examined below under the categories of power and 
structures followed by a case study on China. Conviction in their beliefs has 
long been a characteristic of the Vietnamese government, in an introduction to 
Vietnam in Vietnam Airway's in-flight magazine, Vietnamese history is 
categorised into five periods, the last being 'Independence: The Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam was founded after the 1945 revolution, when President 
Ho Chi Minh declared independence'101 - no mention of the American war! 
4.1 Power 
Templer cites an interesting event that occurred at the Eighth Congress of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party in July 1996. As the final session was about to 
end and new party statutes were being voted on, a former top ideology official 
called Tran Trong Tan stood up and said that the changes to the statutes 
were ideologically unsound. The top institutes of power in Vietnam are the 
Central Committee (whose 160 members meet twice annually to set general 
policy) and the Politburo (which consists of the sixteen most powerful officials 
who actually run the country). The statute would have given the Standing 
Board of the Politburo (the five people who control finance and defence), who 
101 Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Heritage Magazine, March/April 2006) Section 2: Window 
on Vietnam, p.2 
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are not elected by the Central Committee, decision making powers. This, said 
Tan, would 'not be beneficial.' Templer describes astonishment as passing 
through the hall, 'It was extraordinary that anyone would actually stand up at 
such a gathering and voice an opinion.' After Tan was questioned by 
President Le Due Anh, General Secretary Do Muoi (head of the Communist 
Party) interjected, saying 'The Politiburo Standing Board handles affairs on 
behalf of the Politburo and it does not make decisions. The amendment of the 
article should be made with this in mind.' The wording of the changes, which 
would have led to vast power in the hands of five men, was attributed to a 
typist's error. 102 
Power in Vietnam is a cloudy issue. Pye states that historically, the view was 
that those in power should trust no one, opposition was immoral and the sole 
purpose of authority was to prove superiority. 103 Templer suggests that not 
much has changed as he describes the Vietnamese Communist Party as 
barely bothering to 'scratch around for a coherent ideology nowadays' instead 
acknowledging that 'its aim is to keep its monopoly on power, not carry the 
country down the path to some Marxist utopia. '104 This view is also held by 
Murphy who says that 'today, the army, not communism, holds Vietnam 
together.'105 This notion of power being all was noted in pavement analysis 
from a Hanoian during the Party Congress in June 1996: 'The party is like a 
102 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.p.S0-81 
103 Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, p.244 
104 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.353 
105 Murphy, Kenneth, Unquiet Vietnam - A journey to the vanishing world of Indochina 
(London, Gibson Square Books Ltd, 2005) p.38 
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big box. It looks impressive from the outside, makes a good sound if you tap 
it. But if you open the lid you'll see there is nothing inside. '106 
The importance of maintaining power is seen through the control of the media. 
Cultural pollutants is an all-encompassing phrase that covers sex, violence 
and freedom. An English businesswoman in Ho Chi Minh City talked about the 
extent of media control, 
'I used to regularly bring magazines and novels over with me to give to 
the girls in the business centre until one day someone saw me and told 
me that I was breaking the law. Allowing those women to read western 
views on sex and relationships was seen as corrupting. I had to tear 
out the articles concerning sex and now I only bring over cookery and 
homemaking magazines. '107 
The frustration for Vietnamese women is evident. On my visit to Vietnam in 
2006, I began to leave my books and magazines with reception staff at the 
hotels I stayed in. The speed with which the items were hidden away was 
incredible with the individuals trembling with excitement as they profusely 
thanked me. Other pollutants include pirated COs, CO-ROMs and OVOs from 
China. Templer cites the Saigon Giai Phong, the party newspaper in Ho Chi 
Minh City as stating, 'This trade is posing a real threat that demands 
immediate action if the government is to strengthen itself on the ideology and 
cultural fronts.'108 
106 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p. 80 
107 Interview, English Businesswoman (Ho Chi Minh City, April 2005) 
108 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.287 
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My behaviour was perhaps a little reckless. Western visitors are treated with a 
friendly suspicion by authorities, something which those in the tourist industry 
do try to make as palatable as possible for their guests. Coffey recollects her 
concern after she sends a fax message, 
'The fax?' I asked. She was holding it in her left hand. 
'We keep it,' she answered. 
'Why?' 
'To show the police.' 
She nodded to a pile of fax sheets on a nearby table. 109 
Coffey writes of how she desperately tries to think of anything remotely 
disparaging she may have written. Today the internet is watched and I've 
noticed a strange style of writing in the emails I receive from people in 
Vietnam. There is a care for how something is phrased. For instance a 
business woman I met in Vung Tao would often get frustrated at the speed of 
business transactions but sent the following message to me, 'I have just been 
advised that Barry and I need to be in Hue on Wednesday for the signing of 
an MOU with the People's committee. I am sorry I am unable to change this 
date as it has been appointed by the Peoples' committee.' Our entire plans 
had been altered and we would now not be able to meet. This, she said, 
'makes me sad.'110 When I recounted this to a mutual acquaintance, I was met 
with laughter and was told that the woman had taken to adopting Vietnamese-
style turns of phrase in an attempt to avoid attention from those reading her 
mail. 
109 Coffey, Maria, Three Moons in Vietnam - A Haphazard Journey by Boat and Bicycle 
~London, Little, Brown and Company, 1996) p.172 
10 Email from a Business Woman based in Vung Tao. Received 15th March 2006 
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Of course, it's not just tourists and expats who come under suspicion. Madam 
Tran Thi Huong owns a restaurant called Le Lai (also known as 'The Coconut 
Tree') and while she doesn't criticise the government, her actions are 
suggestive of her feelings. Garrett Culhune says that when he first met her 
'she was taking care of 40 children, 18 of them living in her own home. The 
other 22 were residing with various benefactors, persons in her arsenal of 
goodwill.' She believes she 'provided a chance for more than 1 00 children to 
pursue a new life in America. And she's sent nearly 20 to the universities in 
Ho Chi Minh City.' The government is apparently aware of her actions, 
"'They've caught me several times", she says, speaking of what is tantamount 
to her own relocation service. "I don't need a license because I don't use their 
money". Madam Huong has successfully managed to argue that her case is a 
private matter and not (sic) indebted to government.'111 The government has 
clear feelings about how it wishes for its citizens to behave and while Madam 
Huong has managed to avoid repercussions, it's clear that she is not popular. 
One area where the government has eased up is shown by the fact that the 
state no longer controls ideas about what it is to be heroic. While the 
Vietnamese media still waxes lyrical about security and national 
independence (central aspects of the Communist Party's legitimacy) the 
subject arouses little interest among the young. Templer states that when 
young people were asked what they cared about in a poll in the 1990s, 'only 
20 per cent said the nation's security, the least important item on a list of 
twelve. Work, economic status, education and corruption all ranked 
111 Sterling, World Food Vietnam, p.163 
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significantly higher. Encouragingly for the Party, democracy and social 
equality were a concern for only 21 per cent of young people.'112 
An area for concern for the Vietnamese government is the widening gaps in 
society. There are increasing disparities in wealth, age and between urban 
and rural communities. In the past, Vietnam has had near equal outcomes 
(everyone was poor). In losing all but the symbolism of socialism, the party 
has created the problem of developing a new vision for the future. The 
relatively narrow, political elite was faced with showing new ideas that could 
cope with the new diversity. Many leaders felt that power was their right. 
When Templer asked an elderly general who heads the veterans association 
in Ho Chi Minh City why the Party should remain in power, he got the blunt 
reply, 'Because we won the war'. For a long time, the victory of the party was 
used to legitimise power but became a 'fading force' as there was an ever 
growing younger generation that did not remember the war. Templer stated, 
'Now the Party is trying to shift its base of legitimacy to its management of the 
economy. This requires that it essentially bribe people with rapid economic 
growth which in turn requires quick thinking and adaptable policies that are 
grounded in pragmatism, not dogma.'113 Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet 
recognised this and sent a shocking letter to the Politburo in August 1995 
where he outlined five points that he believed should define the new 
Vietnamese Socialism. Power was fifth, listed below social welfare and 
112 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.342 
113 Ibid, p.84 
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environmental protection. 114 Economic success was now seen as paramount 
even to the demise of state-owned and state-linked companies. 
In 2004 the Vietnamese government issued a report charting the progress of 
the 2001-2005 Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan. In the report, 
the government states that 'policies and mechanisms have been introduced 
and implemented that have better mobilised and utilised resources, especially 
capital investment.' The policies were focused on long-term development 
objectives, particularly the 'development of infrastructure' and promotion of 
'economic restructuring toward industrialisation and modernisation' while 
'manufacturing capacity and socio-economic infrastructure have been 
improved and used more efficiently.'115 Since 2000, the Vietnamese economy 
has maintained its rapid GOP growth rate and seen 'outstanding 
achievements' in agriculture (with increased growth rates for production in 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries), industry (growth rates 2.3% above the 
target) and the services industry (a rapidly developing tourist industry and 
growth in the production of services almost meeting the target)116. 
Democratic governments often pride themselves on the checks and balances 
within their systems. It is this evaluation which they argue is missing from 
communist and fascist states. To accept a mistake is to suggest that the 
government is fallible, and this is a dangerous route for a government that 
retains its power through conviction that it is always right. Vietnam does not 
114 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.p.87 and 88-89 
115 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Implementation of Socio-Economic Objectives During the 
Period 2001-2005 and Pre-requisites for the New Period 2006-2010- Government Report for 
the 2004-CG Meeting (Hanoi, 2004) p.1 
116 Ibid, p.p.3-5 
64 
have the degree of checks and balances of a democracy but the government 
argues that each National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam has 
addressed the shortcomings of the previous Congress. Nguyen Phu Trong, a 
member of the Politburo, writes of how the 6th Congress 'pointed out 
difficulties and deeply analysed the shortcomings, mistakes and errors that 
the Party and people should strive to overcome', particularly the failure of 
achieving the sth Congress goal to 'stabilise basically the socio-economic 
situation and the people's livelihood.' These shortcomings were attributed to 
both the party and the state, the Party Central Committee, the Politburo, the 
Secretariat and the Council of Ministers apparently 'conducted a serious self-
criticism over those shortcomings of theirs' and several 'lessons' were drawn 
from the analysis. 117 Though various criticisms can be made of the 
Vietnamese government, such as Templer's saying of the Politburo that 
'almost all power resides in this secretive body that only occasionally makes 
its decisions public,'118 the views laid out by Nguyen Phu Trong 119 reflect a 
genuine desire to improve and develop policies and practices. 
4.2 Government Action 
Below are considerations of three key areas where governmental action is 
representative of its self-confidence. The first area relates to the creation of 
117 Nguyen, Vietnam on the path of renewal, p.p.3-4 
118 Templer, Shadows and Wind, p.80 
119 For most books to be published in Vietnam, especially by members of the Politburo, they 
must be approved. This thesis assumes that Nguyen Phu Trong's book is representative of 
the views of the Vietnamese government since its layout suggests that it was commissioned 
and its content deals with issues that are highly sensitive to the Vietnamese government. 
65 
industrial parks or zones 120 which play an important role in attracting 
investment. The marketing manager mentioned in chapter three was 
considering establishing a factory near Vung Tao on the merits of the 
industrial parks there. 121 The second area relates to consumption and the 
advertising of consumer goods. There are great economic benefits but these 
come at the cost of socialist ideals. The final area looks at corporate 
governance and the improving structures that underpin Vietnamese 
commerce. 
While differing widely in nature, these three areas all reflect the confidence of 
the Vietnamese government to take responsibility for its economic future. 
While industrial parks aim to increase investment, the government does not 
wish for income at any cost and therefore places limitations on advertising. 
Similarly, while good corporate governance standards are attractive to foreign 
investors, the effect that good corporate governance has on the economy of a 
nation cannot be denied. 
The disillusioned Marketing Manager of a British garden ware manufacturer 
explained that while the company was ending its relationship with the factory 
near Ho Chi Minh City, she was considering a private enterprise at an 
industrial park near Vung Tao. She explained this by saying that she felt the 
benefits offered by the parks made up for the problems associated with 
120 These are sites that offer a variety of facilities to investors (both Vietnamese and foreign) 
and ought not be confused with the post-war labour camps where government 'enemies' were 
sent. 
121 Interview, British Marketing Manager (Ho Chi Minh City, April2005) 
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working with the Vietnamese workforce. 122 The kind of benefits provided by 
such zones or parks include some or all of the following: on-site Customs 
Offices and warehousing services, Fibre optic communications, on-site fire 
fighting units, round the clock security and an on-site employment consultancy 
and promotion centres. 
It is also significant that the infrastructure surrounding industrial parks is often 
superior to that elsewhere in Vietnam. In the industrial parks near Vung Tao, 
wide roads with streetlights and smooth surfaces link the numerous industrial 
parks to the harbour. The electricity and water supply is also better than 
elsewhere in the country with tidy cables and submerged pipe work. The main 
concern for the marketing manager was the possibility of reliable fuel supply. 
The factory near Ho Chi Minh City would regularly close for days at a time 
because gas canisters hadn't arrived or the furnaces had broken and there 
was nobody available to repair them. The Vung Tao industrial parks each had 
a gas supply centre and insurance against a lack of fuel was included in the 
ground rates. 123 
The parks near Hanoi have not yet reached Vung Tao standards and there 
are a number of plots of land enclosed by a high wire fence containing nothing 
but a large brightly coloured building and an electrical sub-station. I asked my 
tour guide who owned and ran the parks. It varied, I was told, but you could 
spot Vietnamese ownership by the 'beautiful offices.' The garish replica's of 
English manor houses that I had been wondering at were actually part of the 
122 1nterview, British Marketing Manager (Ho Chi Minh City, April 2005) 
123 Interview, British Marketing Manager (Ho Chi Minh City, April 2005) and visit, Industrial 
Park Offices (Outskirts of Vung Tao, April 2005) 
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sales technique of Vietnamese industrial park owners. 'Very nice. Yes?' 
smiled the tour guide. I conceded that they were certainly large. She 
explained that the parks were built with governmental support but that they 
were run by individuals. 124 This is an important development for the 
Vietnamese government as a move from state-owned enterprises to state-
linked enterprises is a big step and reflects the shifting of power described in 
part 4. 1 above. 
Although products such as Coca-cola were smuggled into Vietnam from China 
and Thailand prior to the lifting of the US embargo in 1994, after it was lifted, 
consumption began to take an increasingly significant role in life, creating 
industries (such as advertising and marketing) and providing work (in the 
production centres). American companies were eager to invest, with Pepsi's 
joint bottling line and advertising campaigns being in a state of limbo, ready to 
go as soon as the trade ban was lifted, and the Vietnamese were eager for 
American goods. When American companies held a trade show that April at 
the Giang Vo Exhibition Centre in Hanoi, they were overwhelmed by crowds 
of thousands eager to look at the goods, despite nothing actually being for 
sale. As a result of pent-up demand and new forms of social competition the 
Vietnamese are now over-importing goods that they cannot afford. In Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City, the children of the middle classes are demanding both 
goods (motorbikes and mobile phones) and services (extra tuition and English 
124 Interview, Vietnamese tour guide (Sinh Binh district, March 2006) 
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classes) of their parents. Such consumption aggravates tensions between 
classes that have only very recently started to emerge. 125 
With the increase in the number of consumer goods came commercial 
advertising. Prior to 1986, all advertising was for the promotion of socialist 
ideals but now commercial advertising is as prolific in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City as Bangkok. Initially the government was happy with the economic 
benefits but soon began to feel distaste at the capitalistic nature of the 
industry and sought to regulate it. The advertising agencies that followed the 
big international companies in the early 1990s began working without clear 
regulations and acted as though they had absolute freedom. This led to a 
government crackdown in 1996 which saw the removal and painting over of 
advertisements and local cultural offices insisting on checking campaigns 
before they were sent to press or installed. Templer states that this process 
led to some almost comic misunderstandings, for example, 'The German 
lingerie company Triumph was stopped from advertising its underwear with 
the slogan 'Fashion and so much more.' The Ho Chi Minh City cultural office 
wanted to know exactly what 'so much more' really meant.'126 
But the Vietnamese government soon developed an understanding of 
advertising and in March 2006, the government banned the advertising of 
powdered milk to children aged under 12 months. Despite health care experts 
saying that breast milk is better for children, especially those under 12 
months, many Vietnamese women have fondness of imported products. Such 
125 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.344 
126 Ibid, p.345 
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products 'advertise the physical and mental development of children' and 
'hoping to give birth to wealthy and intelligent children, many mothers do not 
hesitate to spend several million dong to buy milk for their children.'127 The 
Vietnamese are becoming less of a vulnerable market for sophisticated 
western campaigns and are confident about banning the campaigns that are 
actually harmful. The Vietnamese are also developing their own marketing 
culture. Between April 2005 and March 2006 the quality of signs for 
independent shops and restaurants saw a vast improvement with a clear 
development in the use of logos and slogans. 
Freeman introduces the topic of corporate governance in Vietnam by 
explaining that Vietnam's economic transition from a centrally-planned to a 
market economy is only twenty years old. Its development of a strong 
corporate sector is even younger and the stock market (for the secondary 
trading of shares) was only established in July 2000. Most private enterprises 
(large and small) are state-owned and Freeman explains that the kinds of 
systems and structures in many Vietnamese firms were 'developed over time 
in a somewhat piece-meal fashion, rather than a more systematic way' with 
'the specific rights and responsibilities of managers, shareholders, directors 
and other stakeholders is not clearly defined or differentiated' meaning that 'as 
a consequence, decision-making processes within firms are often opaque and 
ad hoc.'128 
127 
'Baby milk ad ban hits producers' in Vietnam Investment Review (March 13-19 2006) p.1 0 
128 Freeman, Nick J., 'Promoting Good Corporate Governance Practices in Vietnam' in Leong, 
Ho Khai (ed.) Reforming Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia: Economics, Politics and 
Regulations (ISEAS, Singapore, 2005) p.335 
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Freeman argues that corporate governance requires a bearer for the 
promotion of its standard. This is usually the stock exchange and/or the 
securities market regulator but Vietnam's stock market, is young and relatively 
inexperienced. The State Securities Commission (which merged with the 
Ministry of Finance in 2004) regulated the exchange but was regarded as 'a 
relatively weak government agency, compared with larger and more 
established ministries' because it seemed to have 'encountered some difficulty 
in effectively pushing forward pertinent policies and regulations.'129 
Inadequate Corporate Governance runs a number of costs and risks 130 that 
Freeman believes to be underestimated by most policymakers and business 
people. Poor Corporate Governance impacts adversely on the country's 
economy through individual companies having 'a high degree of managerial 
inefficiency resulting from inadequate delineation and definition of 
responsibilities and accountabilities' and the 'objectives of the company are 
often not well defined, or communicated within the management, nor are the 
means of attaining these objectives clearly articulated or understood, in most 
cases.' Poor accounting leads to inaccurate monitoring of company 
performance which results in inefficient production and lower shareholder 
returns (including the state, in the case of SOEs and partially-divested 
enterprises). 
When this is extrapolated across the corporate sector as a whole, the 
costs to the Vietnamese economy are not inconsiderable. (From the 
perspective of the government, corporate profits forgone through 
inefficiencies also mean lower budget revenues through reduced 
129 Freeman, 'Promoting Good Corporate Governance Practices in Vietnam' p.337 
130 See Appendix 2 
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corporate income tax receipts.) The low level of CG standards -
notably in terms of insufficient investor protection and a lack of financial 
transparency in particular- is also incurring a cost in terms of foreign 
investment inflows foregone.' 
Freeman notes than no crisis has yet developed but the possibility is not 
inconceivable. The risk renders Vietnam's corporate sector less robust and as 
Vietnam is 'seeking to rapidly develop its economy and corporate sector to a 
level where it can compete internationally for export markets and compete 
effectively in the domestic market against an increasing number of foreign 
forms' the government cannot afford to not address the issue. After all, 
institutional investors will pay premiums for the reduced risk from investing in 
a company with good Corporate Governance practices. 131 
The Vietnamese government does address these issues and plans to 
'develop proper policy mechanisms to step-up internal development, 
restructure businesses, revitalise production and business activities in 
localities, and increase the competitiveness of individual products and product 
lines and subsequently of the whole economy. '132 Evidence of this was given 
in chapter three, for example the creation of UEL is to 'regulate matters of 
corporate governance, granting a more level playing field than found under 
the current investment regime. '133 
131 Freeman, 'Promoting Good Corporate Governance Practices in Vietnam', p.p.340, 341-342 
and p.345 
132 See Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Implementation of Socio-Economic Objectives During 
the Period 2001-2005 and Pre-requisites for the New Period 2006-2010- Government Report 
for the 2004-CG Meeting, p.18 
133 Document provided by the department of trade and industry at the British Embassy in 
Hanoi: 'New Investment Law', p.1 
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These examples reflect a growing confidence on the Vietnamese 
government's behalf and an important element for the further development of 
self-confidence not only in these areas but across the whole of the 
administrated country is the sharing of information. James D. Wolfowitz, 
President of the World Bank, is cited throughout the overview booklet for the 
Vietnam Public Information Centres Program. His views on the sharing of 
information as essential for sustainable development are clearly supported by 
the organisation which promotes 'public awareness of and access to 
documents, publications, and data - in print, online, in the local language', 
arranges 'seminars, dialogues, web casts, and radio programs on 
development topics' and disseminates 'development information throughout 
the country.'134 
The improvement of information collation and sharing is apparent from a letter 
to the Saigon Times from Tran Viet Thang. His letter outlined some 
suggestions for the Vietnamese state, in order to improve the situation of 
necessary information being 'deficient'. His argument was that 'the information 
collected and processed by too many State agencies, organisations and 
economic entities is similar; the information is not reliable, late and outdated; 
those who want to buy information do not know where to get it and how much 
it is.' His proposed solution is 'the use of the business network of Vietnamese 
in many countries and a system of overseas satellite businesses as bases for 
getting information is advisable.' Such overseas businesses ought to receive 
financial support from the state. The letter goes on to criticise the 
134 The World Bank Group, Vietnam Public Information Centers Program- An Overview, p.3 
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'complicated' and 'slow' administrative processes that accompany trade 
promotion programs and Vietnam's lack of 'national image', which he 
considers to be 'a very big shortcoming and a disadvantage in the strategy of 
positioning Vietnam in the world.'135 The need for a national image has been 
partly addressed. The Vietnam Economic Times: The Guide published results 
of a competition to find a slogan for Vietnam in 2005, the winners of which 
were 'Vietnam: flavours for the mind' (by a Mr Adam McCarty) and 'Vietnam, 
the smile of Asia' (by a Mr Ralph Freda) 136 but whilst these convey 
Vietnamese tourism, Thang explained that Vietnam lacks 'a slogan, an official 
logo for trade, investment, science and technology' that goes beyond tourism 
at international events. 137 
Once this criticism of the government would have been tantamount to treason 
but today's Vietnamese government has less fear of the slippery slope of 
freedom of thought, 138 instead taking interest in the new ideas and possibilities 
that could enable her to realise her dreams of success on the world market. 
4.3 China 
Of all the countries that Vietnam interacts with, the relationship with China is 
perhaps the most contentious. Womack describes Vietnam as having been 'a 
proving ground for China's capacity to influence its neighbours militarily, 
135 Tran Viet Thang, Letters from Readers: Ways to better trade promotion (The Saigon 
Times, No.11-'06 (754) March 11 2006) p.3 
136 Think big, think Vietnam (Vietnam Economic Times: The Guide, April2005) p.7 
137 Tran Viet Thang, Letters from Readers: Ways to better trade promotion (The Saigon 
Times, No.11-'06 (754) March 11 2006) p.3 
136 Although the situation is still not ideal. See part 5.1 of chapter five. 
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economically and ideologically'. 139 From the Vietnamese being the only 
people outside of China to value the study of the Confucian classics and 
adopt the Confucian ways of ancestor worship 140 to them being one of a 
handful of socialist or communist nations, Vietnam has usually been 
connected and affected to the great power. Following normalisation of 
relations in 1991, after disputes in the 1970s had culminated in a border war 
in 1979, the Vietnamese government faced what was likely to be their greatest 
test of confidence, establishing a new relationship with China. 
Since two countries that are adjacent to each other trade about 80 percent 
more than two otherwise similar countries and two countries that speak the 
same language141 trade about 50 percent more than two otherwise similar 
countries, 142 it's unsurprising that trade between Vietnam and China is 
significant. When the Chinese border was reopened in 1991, the sudden 
commerce was immense. But the trade balance was uneven and the number 
of Vietnamese goods going to China were a fraction of the Chinese goods 
coming to Vietnam as Vietnamese products could not match the quality or 
price of Chinese goods. The Vietnamese market also proved useful to the 
Chinese when a currency devaluation required the dumping of goods in order 
to reduce stock levels in warehouses for inventory figures. In return for 
139 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.288 
140 Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, p.59. However, it's 
worth noting that Nguyen Quang Loc, head of the Van Mieu Institute in the Temple of 
Literature (a series of buildings dedicated to Confucius located in Hanoi) argues that 
'Vietnamese Confucianism 'is not just a copy of Chinese Confucianism' but has been adapted 
and shaped by the Vietnamese. Cited in Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern 
Vietnam, p.291 
141 While Chinese differs from Vietnamese, the languages share many features, particularly 
on the borders. 
142 Frankel, Jeffrey 'Giobalisation of the Economy' in Nye, Joesph S., and Donahue, John D., 
Governance in a Globalising World (Brookings Institutional Press, Washington, 2000) p.54 
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absorbing these goods, Vietnam's struggling state industries faced further 
difficulties.143 
Whether border trade with China is fortuitous or not, is a difficult judgement to 
make. The town of Lang Son was destroyed by the Chinese during the border 
war and despite reconstruction, remained weak until trade resumed. Lang Son 
now has a rising skyline dotted with satellite dishes while an ever growing 
number of cars and motorbikes hum below. Standards of living have risen but 
at the cost of a decline in Vietnamese goods in both the state sector and 
private manufacturing. The government initially ignored the trade activities but 
began to disapprove of the bustling trade of Chinese goods. Textile mills, 
pottery factories and shoemakers had suffered and Vietnamese bicycles, 
which Templer describes as 'almost a national emblem since they were used 
to carry rice to the battle of Dien Bien Phu and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh 
trial', were abandoned in favour of lighter and better-made Chinese bicycles. 
This led to Vietnamese government banning the import of seventeen types of 
goods in 1992.144 
But the rules were ignored, something that Templer saw as necessary, for had 
they been upheld, the commerce in Vietnam centred on Hanoi's Dong Xuan 
market in the north and Ho Chi Minh City's Cholon district in the south, which 
had grown massively, would have suffered greatly. 145 Yet despite the 
busyness of these areas, 40% of Cholon's operations are described as on the 
'grey market', beyond government control, leading French writer Didier Lauras 
143 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.283 
144 These included bicycles, light bulbs, porcelain, glass, paper and batteries. 
145 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.p.285 and 286 
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to describe the area as 'a Chinese enclave on Vietnamese soil, an ever 
present reminder of the country's great neighbour.' Lauras described it as 
working faster, selling cheaper, and being utterly unfathomable. Control of 
these areas would mean that the Vietnamese government had succeeded 
where the French and American's had failed, 146 but that does not look likely 
and so the importance of trade there must be evaluated within the 
consideration that only 60% is taxable. 
In 1998 Templer commented that Vietnam's economic links with China were 
developing slowly, saying that Vietnam lacked the confidence to make the 
required moves, adding, 'Officials make ritualistic appeals for more investment 
and aid, but neither side has any expectation of blossoming links in the near 
future.' He attributed this to the countries having very different agenda's. While 
Vietnam wanted the balance of trade to increase between state government 
trade and away from private commerce, China had more pressing issues than 
controlling border provinces. This stemmed from China making up around 10 
percent of Vietnams total imports and exports but Vietnam accounting for a 
tiny fraction of China's trade. This was less of a problem when Vietnam was 
fresh with socialist ideals and fighting capitalist America but after the war, 
Vietnam was 'no longer an ideological little brother to be kept in check with aid 
and preferential deals; it was now a competitor for export markets and 
investment in an increasingly aggressive economic world.' Vietnam needed to 
face the difficulty of deciding how to built links while 'maintaining its own 
146 Hastings, Martin, Travellers Vietnam (Thomas Cook Publishing, Peterborough, 2005) 
p.132 
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economic independence and security' for China, as the more developed 
economic power, had the upper hand. 147 
The main development since Templer published his work was in 2000, when 
the two countries issued the 'Joint Statement on all-round Cooperation in the 
New Century', which outlined a program for the development of friendly 
relations and cooperation between them. 148 A number of interstate visits have 
followed which The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of 
China says have enabled the signing of agreements on trade, investment 
protection, banking settlement, avoidance of double taxation and border trade 
and the establishment of a committee on economic and trade cooperation in 
order to promote rapid development of the bilateral economic and trade 
relations. Developments have not just been economic, the Ministry also lists 
'exchanges and cooperation' in 'cultural, scientific, technological, educational 
and military areas' with 'increasing contacts between the military, parties, 
governments and people's organizations, provinces and cities' while the areas 
for cooperation keep expanding. 149 This is a long way from the days when 
Consumer reports jumped on the dangers of Chinese-made toys and Chinese 
beer was said to contain birth-control pills that would render Vietnamese 
infertile. '150 
147 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.p.287 and 289 
148 China Embassy, Joint Statement on All-round Cooperation in the New Century Between 
the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. 
~http://www.chinaembassy.se/eng/xwdUt1 01 099.htm 25/12/2000) Accessed 02/08/06 
49 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Vietnam Bilateral 
Relations (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2792/default.htm, Last Update: 
2003/1 0/23, Accessed 08/08/06) 
150 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.308 
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There have been two main areas of disputes between Vietnam and China, in 
the Beibu Gulf and the Spratley Islands. Issues in the Beibu Gulf were 
resolved on the 25th of December 2000 when Vietnam and China signed two 
bilateral agreements to deal with maritime issues in the Beibu Gulf, one 
covering maritime boundary delimitation and the other a fisheries agreement. 
They came into force on the 30th June 2004. This followed 27 years of 
negotiations over the delimitation and only occurred due to the nominalization 
of relations in 1991. The problem of ownership was that the Beibu Gulf was 
only 180 miles wide and According to the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), countries with a coastline claim not only 12 miles 
of territorial sea but also 200 miles of exclusive economic zone and 
continental shelf which they have the exclusive right to develop, maintain and 
manage the natural resources within the area of sea. Since the agreements 
have come into force, joint oil and gas surveys into the body of water have 
been made. 
Issues regarding the Spratly Islands are ongoing. The Spratly Islands are a 
selection of partially submerged rocks and reefs, with debatable habitation, 151 
contested for ownership by China, Vietnam and Taiwan (Brunei, Malaysia and 
the Philippines also claim various parts). 152 The islands are excellent fishing 
sites and oil was discovered in 1968. Despite the region being largely 
unexplored, China estimates that there are oil and gas reserves that would 
make the islands the fourth largest bed in the world. The Spratly Islands have 
151 Almost all of the land is at some point submerged, making the islands unsuitable for 
farming. Despite this, some residences have been built. 
152 Most claims are historical, but are also based upon internationally accepted principles 
extending territorial claims offshore onto a country's continental shelf and the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
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no ports or harbors but have four airports and have witnessed Military 
skirmishes numerous times in the past two decades. The most serious of the 
South China Sea disputes were in 1976, when China invaded and captured 
the Paracel Islands from Vietnam, and in 1988, when Chinese and 
Vietnamese navies clashed at Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands, sinking 
several Vietnamese boats and killing over 70 sailors. The situation has 
improved since then and during the 8th ASEAN summit in 2002, ASEAN 
members and China agreed not to engage in activities that would escalate the 
situation. However, in April 2004, 60 Vietnamese tourists took an 8-day boat 
trip to the lslands. 153 Vietnam appears over-confident that it can behave in 
such a way and continues to expand construction of facilities in the Spratly 
Islands; in March 2005, the national oil companies of China, the Philippines, 
and Vietnam signed a joint accord to conduct marine seismic activities in the 
Spratly Islands. 154 
The Vietnamese government is clearly gaining in confidence in dealing with 
China. Trade negotiations suggest that China is taking Vietnam ever more 
seriously and dispute resolution is no longer primarily driven by Beijing. 
4.4 Summary 
The nature of power in Vietnam has shifted considerably in recent years with 
the focus changing from socialist ideals to economic success. Power as a 
153 Morris, Kylie, Vietnam Starts Spratly Tours (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
~acific/3638323.stm, 191h April 2004) 
54 The CIA, The World Factbook (https:/lwww.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/vm.html, 
Accessed 20th July 2006) 
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goal in itself is still pursued but ideology has largely fallen away. The only 
ideals that are maintained are those which ensure the continuation of power, 
such as reducing cultural pollutants and monitoring the activities of citizens, 
expats and tourists. 
Governmental action supports this notion of economic success as being 
paramount with the development of industrial parks, the diplomacy 
surrounding advertising and the establishment of corporate governance 
structures. 
Looking at China specifically, an important issue regarding trade between the 
great power and Vietnam has been its uneven nature. For the foreseeable 
future China will continue to be more significant to Vietnam than Vietnam is to 
China but the 'Joint Statement on all-round Cooperation in the New Century' 
will hopefully prevent resentment from the Vietnamese and will avoid anti-
Chinese propaganda and policy. 
The Beibu Gulf acts as an example of how the Vietnamese and Chinese can 
solve territorial disputes and will perhaps pave the way to resolution in the 
Spratly Islands. 
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5 : Citizen confidence 
Citizen confidence relates to the confidence that Vietnam's citizens have in 
their government. It is examined below under the categories of leadership, 
standard of living and Viet Kieu and Viet Hoa Confidence. Without realising, I 
adopted Jamieson's methodology when conducting research for this chapter 
as looking back over my notebooks in the UK, I realised 'almost everything 
truly important was gained from spontaneous experience "recollected in 
tranquillity", to borrow Wordsworth's dictum on poetry. I learned from being 
around, and being open to, people going about their daily lives.'155 
5.1 Leadership 
Paul Wolfowitz, President of the World Bank, stated in 2005 that 'perhaps the 
most important determinant for reducing poverty is leadership'. Effective 
leaders, he argues, 'recognise that they are accountable to their people' and 
'effective leaders listen.' Accountability is of key importance as it 'nurtures the 
soil in which a robust civil society and an energetic private sector can 
flourish. '156 Vietnamese history is not one that casts its leadership in a good 
light, from the cruel (such as the unjust tax calculations of the French 
administration) to the ridiculous (such as the French imposition of required 
155 Jamieson, Neil L., Understanding Vietnam (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993) 
Rix 56 Wolfowitz, Charting a Way Ahead- The Results Agenda, p.p.S-7 
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quantities of alcohol consumption 157), the people of Vietnam have been 
subjected to self-serving colonists and now have a government that is only 
thirty years old. Tin Sui's memoir, Following Ho Chi Minh is littered with 
examples of how the government of the Socialist republic of Vietnam 
struggled in its infancy. Here he explains the problem of not meeting the 
expectations of the citizens of newly united Vietnam: 
At first there were many people who did not realise the implications of 
our victory. They saw it simply as the end of a long war and believed 
that immediately thereafter we would rebuild the country for the next 
generation. What they did not realise is that fighting a war is easy 
compared with reconstruction. They thought that with continuing help 
from our international friends, our towns and cities would soon become 
beautiful. Only gradually did they come to realise that coping with an 
economy in times of peace is far more difficult than waging a war. 158 
The Vietnamese expectation of aid is explored in chapter three but what was 
perhaps most fundamental was the realisation that Soviet and Sino support 
had stemmed from the desire of those countries to see Communism succeed 
against Capitalist America and not for Vietnam's own sake. Unlike countries 
released from colonists over a period of years where control was gradually 
relinquished, for the Vietnamese government, it was as if waking up after the 
end of the war, they discovered they had a country and were unsure how to 
progress. 
157 Villages were required to purchase certain quantities of rice wine in order to maintain the 
economic balance. The amount represented unrealistic levels of consumption and was at an 
unreasonable price. 
158 Bui, Following Ho Chi Minh: the memoirs of a North Vietnamese colonel, p.88 
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It is unsurprising then that the government did not find the transition simple. 
Pye described the Vietnamese government as operating within a 'spirit of 
clandestineness' which bred 'intrigue, convoluted calculations, and a constant 
suspicion that no relationship is what it appears to be.' There are many 
references to the government being incapable of fulfilling its duties. Power 
was ever changing and followers (particularly middle-level cadres and 
functionaries) needed to profess loyalty (to ensure protection of higher 
officials) while being prepared to change alignments. Pye cites Pike as noting, 
'No strong traitor stigma prevails in Vietnam,' a statement qualified by the fact 
that 'the majority of Vietnamese of middle age or older have been on all sides 
of all political issues.'159 Everything was secretive and closed, arguably to hide 
the confusion that swirled beneath the authoritarian front. 
The introduction of Doi Moi saw a vast improvement as it led to a greater 
tolerance and pluralism in the arts, the media and religion. Williams describes 
it by saying 'Glasnost had come to Vietnam.' Key evidence for Williams comes 
via the NVL articles. Articles started being published in Nhan Dan on the 25th 
of May 1987 written by NVL (the initials of the Party's leader, Nguyen Van 
Linh). 'The articles pressed the need for economic reform, urged greater 
democracy in party life and strongly criticised middle-level bureaucrats who 
were resisting the tide of reform.' The articles were eagerly interpreted as 
giving permission to critique the government, particularly as they urged the 
public to 'act against bureaucratic tyrants and bullies.' A more liberal 
governing trend emerged as, after some hesitation, the letters from citizens 
159 Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, p.243 
84 
began pouring in as the recognition of Linh's commitment to reform began to 
be realised. 160 
However, the opening of the media must not be overstated. In 2005 the 
director of Hai Phong company, a publishing company in Vietnam, was forced 
to resign, allegedly because of his involvement in a book critical of the 
Communist Party. He had written the preface to the memoirs of former leader, 
Doan Duy Than, entitled 'To be a man is difficult. To be a socialist man is 
even harder.'161 Then in 2006, the world media was announced that two men 
had received a jail sentence after a one-day trial where they were found guilty 
of criticizing the government on an internet forum. These actions inspired a 
typically-authoritarian knee-jerk reaction from the Vietnamese government 
and reflect how limited political freedom is in Vietnam. 
But of greater concern to the average Vietnamese is support for their 
livelihood. While the government aims to protect their citizens from variations 
in international rice prices, the imposed price controls and quotas are 
somewhat ineffective since farmers rarely get the prices that the government 
sets. Templer states that this is because most state firms purchase rice 
through intermediaries who depress prices around the time of harvest. He 
explains, 
For example in the first half of 1997, the government's minimum price 
for rice in the Mekong Delta was around 1,500 dong per kilo of paddy. 
160 Williams, Michael C., Vietnam at the Crossroads (London, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1992) p.p.27 -28 
161 BBC Vietnamese Service reporters, Vietnam publisher forced to quit (BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4676325.stm, 13 July, 2005, Accessed 20th July 
2006) 
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However at the height of the harvest when most farmers are forced to 
sell, traders rarely paid more than 1,100 dong per kilo. This meant that 
while farmers were barely able to cover their costs, the private traders 
and bureaucrats in the state rice trading firms were sharing out profits 
of at least 400 dong per kilo. The cost of growing a crop is about 900 
dong per kilo, leaving the farmers with only the narrowest of margins 
out of which they also have to pay interest on loans and a multitude of 
taxes imposed by local officials. To add insult to these injuries, the 
government makes farmers pay taxes based on them receiving 1,500 
dong per kilo, while trading companies are subsidised with cheap credit 
from state banks. 162 
This is particularly disappointing when one considers the fact that the 
government realised that the setting of official prices for grain was 
unproductive for collective farms in the 1960s and 70s. 163 The farming 
situation is different since decollectivisation but there are still individuals 
profiting to the detriment of others. 
Yet the Vietnamese are positive. In Coffey's account of her trip through 
Vietnam she relates how a man called Minh explained the Vietnamese 
experience. For them, the importance is the freedom, however limited, to 
trade. The pepper grown in his village is exported to Iran and Iraq, the price 
had a 'problem' but he pointed out the tile roofs, saying the village was still 
rich. Working for themselves increased motivation in the pepper and rice 
fields, 
162 Templer, Robert, Shadows and Wind, p.60 
163 Kerkvliet, Benedict J. Tria, 'Village-State Relations in Vietnam: The Effect of Everyday 
Politics on Decollectivisation', The Journal of Asian Studies (Vol.54, No.2, May 1995) p.409 
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'Before,' said Binh [Coffey's translator], 'they must give most of pepper 
and rice crop to government. First to Diem and other South Vietnamese 
presidents, then to Communists. Now they can keep it. Before, the 
people don't work so hard and Vietnam import the rice. Now they work, 
and since 1989 we are the big exporter, the third biggest in the world 
US, then Thailand, then Vietnam. '164 
It is clearly important to consider the situation with a consideration for the 
history of the working lives of the Vietnamese. 165 
However, there is still a key area of localised Vietnamese production that 
requires the support of the government and is yet to receive it. The 
Vietnamese culture associated with Nuoc Mam is phenomenal and as 
significant to the people as olive oil is to the Italians. Nuoc Mam is the fish 
sauce integral to Vietnamese cooking and is considered by many in Southeast 
Asia to be the finest sauce of the region. The importance of origin for Key 
Limes and Sicilian Lemons is integral to their value, so too is Phu Quoc to 
Nuoc Mam as true Nuoc Mam requires the fish to be processed in a manner 
that can only be achieved by a whole population working together. 166 Should 
the Vietnamese government manage to protect this commodity, thus 
validating authenticity, prices will rise, and food quality will improve, thus 
164 Coffey, Maria, Three Moons in Vietnam - A Haphazard Journey by Boat and Bicycle 
{Little, Brown and Company, London, 1996) p.p.66-67 
65 Kerkvliet provides an excellent account of the decollectivisation process in his work on 
everyday politics (1995 and 2005). 
166 The process involves laying the fish out in the open air to dry before packing them in 
barrels and topping with water. Various pressings are taken with the barrels being topped up 
with more water. The method is intrinsic to the result and the process therefore cannot be 
mechanised. 
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affirming Vietnam as a cuisine country which will increase tourism. This would 
increase confidence in both Vietnam's citizens and world consumers. 
It is essential that Vietnam's leaders take seriously the importance of their 
citizens in business terms. 167 In 2006 I returned to an art shop in Ho Chi Minh 
City which I had bought a painting from the previous year. The owner quickly 
approached me and announced 'I know you.' I smiled and replied that perhaps 
I had been there a year ago. 'Yes', she nodded happily, 'you bought this 
picture' and thrust an almost exact copy of my painting towards me. 168 
Arguably, the number of young white women trawling the art shops of Ho Chi 
Minh City is minimal but I was impressed. 169 This attention to detail is what 
makes Nuoc Mam, so special. Unfortunately the Vietnamese leaders are not 
meeting the needs of their people is in the protection of this native foodstuff. 
There is high demand for high quality sauces in the region and since many 
believe Nuoc Mam to be among the best, low value Vietnamese or Thai Nuoc 
Mam is being labelled as though it came from the island of Phu Quoc. 
Templer describes the sauce-makers on the island as reacting to this fraud 
with 'the indignation of champagne viticulturers when the name of their 
product is violated.' And there is little the sauce-makers can do. 170 
167 It is worth mentioning Kim Quy, a hairdresser who introduced the concept of branding to 
Hanoi in 1987 when she had hats made with her name on them. Scott, Life in Hanoi - Local 
and expat stories in Vietnam's capital, p.23 
168 Most art in Vietnam consists of the repeated copying of popular images. Something that 
infuriates creative business people such as Christina Yu of lpa Nima who struggle to see 
copyright upheld. 
169 Interaction with this individual occurred in April 2005 and March 2006. The shop is located 
in the close vicinity of the post office in Ho Chi Minh City on a street of shops trading in 
Vietnamese handicrafts and fake designer goods. 
170 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.64 
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The positive and negative aspects of the Vietnamese leadership are almost 
equal in terms of outcome but the essential direction is positive. As explored 
below, the standard of living is rising and growth is encouraging. While the 
leaders of Vietnam have a fair way to go, the citizens have every reason to 
feel increasing confident that they can meet the challenge of leading them 
towards a successful future. 
5.2 Standard of living 
A question whose answer is at once obvious and immediately unanswerable 
emerged quickly during my trips to Vietnam. What percentage of people truly 
believe in the socialist values of their government? The obvious answer is 
very few as the Vietnamese people are true capitalists, finding enterprise in 
every situation and expressing great creativity in their quest for financial 
security171 but the question is technically unanswerable because they largely 
lack the vocabulary for expressing dissatisfaction. Where dissent does occur, 
it is subtle and 'everyday' such as bicycles using roads reserved for motorised 
vehicle roads. 
When I asked a Vietnamese tour guide how people felt about the toll booths 
for the new infrastructure, it took several minutes to get an answer beyond 'It 
is the law, it is not optional. '172 The road (north of Hanoi) seemed to be 
171 My first impression of Ho Chi Minh City in 2005 was that there was very little going on 
outside of the main streets but after a while my eyes became accustomed to recognising 
enterprise. From a child with four oranges on a towel to an old man with an oily rag, everyone 
can provide some kind of good or service. After a day in the city, the challenge became 
s.gotting someone who wasn't selling something or providing a service. 
1 2 Interview, Vietnamese tour guide (Sinh Binh district, March 2006) 
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improving for the sole purpose of providing adequate transportation of 
products from the western-owned factories that are flourishing in the area. It 
was already adequate for what I identified as Vietnamese transport (including 
the vehicle I was travelling in), only unsuitable for the very large vehicles that 
transport factory produced goods. And yet this was the road that transported 
much of Hanoi's food from the fields and farms (often precariously balanced 
on the ubiquitous motorbike), it seemed deeply unfair to the typical farmer and 
his family in the city as there is no alternative route, as is common in 
Europe. 173 Improved infrastructure is of course important with roads, rail and 
ports being essential to enabling trade 174 but compatibility with Vietnamese 
lifestyles ought not be overlooked. 
The issue of infrastructure is based on a balance however, whereas the needs 
of the ordinary Vietnamese citizens are somewhat opposed to the needs of 
the factory owners and users. Where there is no opposing set of needs, the 
government is committed to the improvement of the standard of living of her 
citizens. An area where the Vietnamese government has been particularly 
commended is with regard to its attitude to disease. The 1991 malaria 
epidemic that affected a million people was treated so efficiently that 
outbreaks ended within 5 years with mortality levels dropping by 97 percent. 
Paul Wolfowitz, President of the World Bank praises the government's 
targeting of assistance 'at village level, distributing bed nets, drugs and 
173 The German autobahns and Spanish highways offer both high speed tolled roads and 
lower speed free roads. This has caught on elsewhere and Bangkok has a highly efficient 
expressway that travels over the original, slower, road. 
174 Interview, Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy (Hanoi, March 2006). 
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insecticides.'175 With the greater enemy of HIV, Vietnam has again received 
positive comments. Compared to other Asian countries, including fairly liberal 
Thailand, there has been less denial of the problem. In October 1992176, a 
national committee was established to co-ordinate policies. Condom 
advertisement is extensive and there are even needle exchange programs. 
Vietnam's large numbers of drug addicts 177 and prostitutes suggest that HIV 
will be an important issue. 178 
Of course, while the government may have a reasoned attitude to the 
problem, culturally it is still necessary for HIV sufferers to hide their status, as 
in many cases, it is a firing offence and the attitude is slow to move. Dang Thi 
Dung, is just one of many who have lost their jobs due to their HIV status and 
now works with SMARTWork, one of seven HIV/AIDS prevention and control 
projects in the country. 179 The true complexity of the problem has emerged 
from the necessity of civil organizations. Such organizations demand a voice, 
a situation incompatible with full authoritarian control, but one which the 
Vietnamese government is prepared to allow. This compromising of 
authoritarian ideals is something that creates great confidence in the 
governments' attitude to the ethics surrounding health. 
175 Wolfowitz, Charting a Way Ahead- The Results Agenda, p.1 0 
176 This was a fast response. The first case of positive HIV was reported in December 1990 in 
Ho Chi Minh City. World Health Organisation Regional Office for the Western Pacific Ministry 
of Health, Consensus Report on STI, HIV and AIDS Epidemiology Vietnam (December 2000) 
R6 77 Opium addiction is one of Vietnam's greatest social problems. 
178 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.p.238-239 
179 Hien, Thu, 'Woman takes AIDS fight to work' on Viet Nam News 
(http://vietnamnews. vnagency.com. vn/showarticle.php?num=02SOC 190706, Accessed 191h 
July 2006) 
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After the matter of health, the most important consideration for standard of 
living is wealth and its key influence, employment. There are two responses to 
the move from a planned to a market economy. For some, such as Dzung (a 
motorbike taxi or xe om driver), a job for life was part of what they were 
fighting for during the war. Scott tells Dzung's story and explains how 'he 
found he had to fend for himself by whatever means he could.' For people like 
Dzung, life is now unstable and while they are neither richer nor poorer than 
when they were employed by the state, they now work harder and miss out on 
holiday trips, pensions and health care. 18° For many who fought for a socialist 
future, the current employment situation is a let down. Coffey relates another 
story, of Mai, a woman she met in Hoi An. Mai relates that her father was a 
Lieutenant Colonel with the South Vietnamese Navy. The threat of a life 
sentence after the end of the war led him to suicide, 
Since then me and my family are punished. I was a teacher, but now I 
can't work for the government. So I help this guy get business mending 
bikes and renting out motor cycles to tourists . . . This government is 
Communist ... but it does not help the people. I have to work night and 
day to pay to send my three kids to school.'181 
As Dzung puts it, 'life has been a constant struggle with little time for 
relaxation. And there seems to be no end in sight.'182 The problem is not just 
the lack of quality employment but that the Vietnamese people were promised 
something that the government has failed to deliver. 
180 Scott, Ufe in Hanoi- Local and expat stories in Vietnam's capital, p.39 
181 Coffey, Three Moons in Vietnam- A Haphazard Journey by Boat and Bicycle, p.161 
182 Scott, Life in Hanoi- Local and expat stories in Vietnam's capital, p.39 
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Wolfowitz stated 'We cannot make headway in the fight against poverty 
without supporting equality before the law and the legal empowerment of the 
poor.'183 And it is important to recognise that an important focus of the 
Vietnamese government has been about employment rights. The British 
embassy regularly stresses to investors, the importance of employing 
Vietnamese lawyers to write clauses to protect them from abandonment by 
their workforce. 184 And there is little room for recourse when one wants to get 
rid of an employee as employees have almost infinite protection under 
Vietnamese law. An expatriated Australian manager of a prestigious Ho Chi 
Minh City hotel explained that her hotel has twenty percent more staff on their 
books than they require. The excess staff are the employees who are 
incapable of fulfilling their duties yet cannot be fired. New staff are employed 
to take on their roles while the manager tries to find things 'to keep the 
useless ones busy. '185 It is an impossible situation that frustrates the manager 
greatly, her only consolation being that her Vietnamese boss is perfectly 
happy with the situation. 
The reason for the disparity in viewpoints of the workforce relates to the ratio 
of informal employment (described by Warf as 'unstable, low-paying jobs -
such as day labourers, black-market activities, prostitution and crime, street 
hawking, recycling of garbage') being far greater than the size of the formal 
employment (described by Warf as 'stable, relatively well-paying jobs with 
regular working hours - for example in multinational corporations or the 
183 Wolfowitz, Charting a Way Ahead- The Results Agenda, p.8 
184 Interview, Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy (Hanoi, March 2006) 
185 Interview, Hotel Manager (Ho Chi Minh City, April 2005) 
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government'186). Those in formal employment enjoy a variety of rights and 
privileges while those informally employed struggle. There is also a growing 
formal entrepreneurial spirit 187 among the Vietnamese with 2000 times the 
number of private Vietnamese firms today than there were sixteen years 
ago. 188 While the informally employed do not yet have their needs met under 
the eyes of the law, it must be acknowledged that the formally employed and 
the entrepreneurs do have confidence in the government. 
Evidence that these improvements to health and employment policies can be 
seen in a growing trend in the suburbs of Hanoi; for the first time, people are 
investing in their homes. Still quintessentially Vietnamese (high rise and 
skinny 189) they are better built and are being painted. Paint in Vietnamese 
homes is new, and very exciting - dusky pink, mustard yellow and sage green 
injected with turquoise, gold and white (often in revolting combinations) 190 and 
it's here to stay - proudly displayed above the uppermost window are the 
dates the homes were built, from 2001 to present day. Of course, the vast 
majority of people still live in make-shift dwellings, unadorned and temporary 
but the view expressed by an Australian expatriate in 2005, that the 
Vietnamese have no concept of building homes that will last (favouring 
186 Warf, Barney, 'Economic Geography' in The National Geographic Society, Desk Reference 
~1999) p.360 
87 As opposed to informal entrepreneurial spirit which relates to small or sole trader scale 
business. 
186 A growth from 100 to 200,000 firms. The statistic was cited at the Euro Money Conference 
in Hanoi in March 2006. 
189 The width of Vietnamese houses is due to land splitting. Properties were divided equally 
between all sons upon the father's death. As the shop front was the most valuable part of the 
house, each son got a share which meant that houses got narrower whilst maintaining their 
other dimensions. Many houses are too narrow for any kind of staircase and ladders are used 
instead. The situation bordered on the absurd until the government put regulations in place. 
190 The vast enthusiasm reflected in advertising in Vietnam is incredible and it could be 
interpreted that colour was once banned. 
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patching them every year) or that have no charm or beauty, is now 
outdated. 191 For a long time, ownership of property was a transient thing and it 
was illogical to invest in a property you may be unaccountably moved on from. 
That people are investing in their homes signifies their faith in the stability of 
the government. 
In addition to the transformation of Vietnamese homes, there has been a 
change in transportation. The motorbike is taking over from the bicycle as the 
vehicle of choice (there is also an increase in the number of cars). 192 An oft 
repeated comment among expatriates is that there's nothing a Vietnamese 
person won't do for a Honda Dream II. Templer cites Nguyen Viet Hong as 
explaining this by saying 'If you want to do business and ride a bicycle, no one 
will believe you have the money to do anything.' A motorbike is an essential 
status symbol and pride in this symbol has spawned hundreds of wash shops, 
repair centres and spare parts shops. In 1996, Templer calculated that in the 
past five years the $8billion value of motorbike sales (500,000 legally per year 
plus 500,000 smuggled bikes) is greater than the amount the country has 
received in actual inflows of aid and foreign investment in the same period.' 
He states that in the early 1990s 'it was better to hold wealth in a motorbike 
than in risky banks or in cash during a time of inflation' because Honda Dream 
lis held their value. He explains that, 
191 Interview, Hotel Manager (Ho Chi Minh City, April2005) 
192 The author noticed a significant change in the ratio of bicycles to motorbikes between April 
2005 and March 2006 and the Vietnam Association of Bicycle and Motorcycle Production 
(Vinacycle) reported in 2006 that 'manufacturers sold 2.2mil units, and in the first two months 
of this year the number of sold bicycles was 150,000 units higher than the same period last 
year' and will continue to rise before making way for cars. Over 2.5 motorbikes to be 
purchased in 2007 (http://english. vietnamnet. vn/biz/2007/03/672635/, 13/03/07) 
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Dream lis were at the centre of some complex financial transactions; 
businesses in need of loans would buy them on hire purchase and then 
resell them immediately, usually for a small profit. They could then 
invest the cash in their businesses and pay back the dealer over the 
next year.'193 
While this is no longer the case (savings rates are increasing), motorbikes 
remain ever popular, particularly among the young people who tour the cities 
of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City with their friends. 
One of the best ways to assess the standard of living is to examine the growth 
in Gross Domestic Product (GOP). GOP has risen year on year since 1989 
and continues to rise, a positive sign of the increase in the standards that the 
Vietnamese people live in. 
Growth in GOP 
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193 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p. p.332 and 333 
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It is worth remembering Pye noting that while 'in the West, when people 
reached the standard of living of those in East Asia today, they usually 
insisted upon having greater freedom. The Asian ideal of paternalistic 
authority makes authoritarian rule more endurable. '194 The Vietnamese, 
particularly in urban areas, are becoming more satisfied with their lot but there 
is still a way to go, as a poem by Hoang Viet Hang in Heritage Fashion 
(Vietnam Airlines lnflight Magazine) reflects: 
accustomed 
I am still myself 
The myself of yesterday 
Accustomed to defeat 
Accustomed to wearing the rain like sadness 
And accustomed to wrapping it up inside my soul 
The pristine state of loneliness 
A lifetime. 
Hoang Viet Hang 195 
194 Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, p.329 
195 Hang, Hoang Viet, Accustomed (Heritage Fashion, February/March 2006) p.69 
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5.3 Viet Kieu and Viet Hoa Confidence 
The Viet Kieu 196 are the individuals of Vietnamese descent who do not live in 
Vietnam. In the vast majority of cases they are boat people refugees and their 
families. The topic of the Viet Kieu is one of the most contentious in modern 
Vietnam as for most Vietnamese they are both the resented rich and fortunate 
whilst also being the estranged and greatly missed relatives. To appreciate 
the complexity of issues surrounding the Viet Kieu one must appreciate the 
importance of family to the Vietnamese. In Vietnam, one is defined by one's 
ancestors and visitors are often perplexed by the interest that locals have in 
their families. 197 Supporting one's family and being loyal against all odds is 
paramount to Vietnamese culture and is a key theme of Vietnam's national 
poem, the tale of Kieu. 198 
Equally for the Viet Kieu, returning home can be a difficult experience. 
Californian based Andrew Pham struggled to find the 'beautiful' country of his 
ancestors, instead 'pitying the Vietnamese who believe with all their hearts 
that Vietnam, indeed, is the most gorgeous place on earth' His key impression 
of his early family was that they were eager for what he, as a Viet Kieu could 
196 Viet Kieu refers to overseas Vietnamese. The majority of the Viet Kieu are the boat people 
(and their descendents) who fled southern Vietnam after the end of the war. They had feared 
~ersecution due to supporting the US and their return was often one of trepidation. 
97 Scott notes numerous examples in her books Life in Hanoi and Hanoi Stories, including 
being questioned on where her distant relatives were buried and when their death date was. 
The author recollects the incredulity of the people she met throughout Vietnam when she 
explained that she did not carry photographs of even her closest family. Scott, Pam, Hanoi 
Stories- Eight wonderful years in Vietnam's capital (New Holland Publishers, Sydney, 2004) 
and Scott, Ufe in Hanoi- Local and expat stories in Vietnam's capital 
196 The poem tells the story of a young woman called Thuy Kieu, who sacrifices herself to 
prevent her father and brother from going to jail by unwittingly selling herself as a prostitute. 
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provide, despite his poverty199. Throughout his memoirs he recounts being 
overcharged for not being Vietnamese200 and facing aggression for claiming to 
be Vietnamese (at one point conceding that he is a Korean pretending to be 
Vietnamese to avoid an attack).201 
It's a subject further complicated by the fact that Ho Chi Minh was away from 
Vietnam for thirty-five years before his return to lead the revolution. By 
definition, the father of Vietnamese socialism was Viet Kieu himself. 202 That 
Viet Kieu became used as an insult2°3 reflects the confusion and bitterness of 
the Vietnamese people. This is compounded by confusion over passports, 
with the Vietnamese government having issues with dual citizenship and 
demanding that Viet Kieu's have visas to their homeland. 204 
Yet the many misunderstandings surrounding what it means to be Viet Kieu 
are largely supported by the Viet Kieu themselves. The Vietnamese hate to 
lose face to the extent that Jimmy Nguyen, a Seattle jeweller who spends 
several months a year in Ho Chi Minh City, rents returning families heavy gold 
and diamond jewellery. They leave their cars with him as collateral and return 
with the jewellery and a rental fee when they return. 'When they go back to 
Vietnam they say they own a restaurant but of course they just work in one; 
199 By American standards Pham was travelling on the tightest of shoestrings. 
200 This is despite attempts by the government in 1997 to end dual pricing for Viet Kieu. 
201 Pham, Andrew X., Catfish and Mandala: A Vietnamese Odyssey (London, Flamingo, 2000) 
~ 155 and references throughout. 
2 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.322 
203 See Pham, Catfish and Mandala, throughout. 
204 Visa necessity is the topic of a large number of Viet Kieu blogs, see for example, Tin, 
When will Viet Kieu enjoy visa exemption? (Vietgate, 
http:l/weblog.viet.net/article.php/20050419202954264, April 15th 2005, Accessed 4th July 
2006) 
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you can't go back and say you are just a waiter in a pho205 restaurant,' he 
said. '206 Small wonder then, that the image in Vietnam is that all Viet Kieu are 
enormously successful and wealthy and are expected to come back laden 
with gifts. 
The Vietnamese government has unsurprisingly been taken in by this act and 
there was expectation that the government could look to the overseas 
Vietnamese to return with cash and Western business savvy in the way the 
overseas Chinese have to China. Templer cites the 'oft-repeated figure in the 
media ... that there were 40,000 Viet Kieu professionals working for 
organisations such as NASA and the World Bank who were longing to return 
home to help the fatherland.' He notes wryly that 'it was never questioned why 
these people should give up their jobs and professional respect to return to a 
country from which many fled under terrible circumstances' and where they 
have little way of proving ownership of the property they left behind.207 
In 1998, Templer said that despite the huge numbers of Viet Kieu returning for 
a visit, very few had returned to live or invest and cites Nguyen Ngoc Ha, 
President of the Ho Chi Minh City Committee for Overseas Vietnamese as 
saying 'Viet Kieu investment is minimal, not even 1 per cent of foreign 
investment capital.' But leap forward eight years and the 20 percent reduction 
in taxes and flat 5 per cent tax on profit remittances with Viet Kieu having the 
same rights as domestic firms to lease property and hire staff (unlike other 
205 Pho is Vietnam's national dish. It is essentially a soup dish which can take many forms and 
which consumers affect by adding the final ingredients themselves. 
206 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.312 
207 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.312 
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foreign investors)208 has led to drastic changes. Now the Viet Kieu are wanting 
to return and it's due to the simple change of their confidence in their 
fatherland. The Viet Kieu are beginning to be welcomed and this has had a 
profound effect on them.209 
To understand the significance of feeling welcome, one need only look back to 
the late 1990s, when laws on Viet Kieu investment required proof that the 
investor was of sound mind.210 Now the Head of Trade and Industry at the 
British Embassy in Hanoi describes them as 'bringing a lot of remittances to 
the country, a hell of a lot of money' which he explains is the 'sort of push ... 
that will give a kick to the economy' because 'we're seeing this confidence in 
people to come back to Vietnam. '211 
The Viet Hoa are the Vietnamese descended from Chinese immigrants and 
were once Vietnam's largest minority group. While they now only make up 
1.1% of the population, the Viet Hoa are an important population as they are 
entwined in Vietnamese-Chinese relations. Despite being largely 
inconspicuous (having Vietnamese names and speaking Vietnamese), they 
have been subject to varying degrees of victimisation. They have been 
banned from joining the army (whilst also being under threat of being forced to 
take Vietnamese nationality and being drafted) and had limited opportunity to 
hold posts in the bureaucracy or access education. The Viet Hoa were also 
208 1bid, p.p.312-313 
209 Interview, Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy (Hanoi, March 2006) 
210 Nguyen Binh speaking to The Saigon Times Weekly. Cited in Templer, Shadows and 
Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.313 
211 Interview, Head of Trade and Industry at the British Embassy (Hanoi, March 2006) 
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subject to ethnic cleansing in 1975 (where nearly half the 1.3 million Chinese 
living in Vietnam left the country212). 
The Viet Hoa were pawns in Vietnam's disputes with China with both sides 
trading accusations over the community. The Chinese accused the 
Vietnamese of discrimination,213 of charging the Viet Hoa to leave the country 
when they were being forced out, and the Vietnamese claimed that it was 
Chinese spies who were encouraging people to leave. T em pier argues that, 
There is no doubt about the discriminatory policies of those times. The 
government banned the hiring of ethnic Chinese, students were 
removed from colleges and schools, and businesses owned by the 
community had to be turned over to the state. In September 1975, the 
government started rounding up 'big capitalists', mostly Chinese from 
Cholon. Chinese were forced to take Vietnamese nationality, 
something that many had avoided until then. 
After relations between Vietnam and China worsened in the late 1970s, the 
campaign known as 'X2' was developed and in March 1978 the nationalization 
of Chinese wealth began and businesses were confiscated. 214 
The Viet Hoa however, are a resilient community and today, Vietnam's largest 
private company, Biti's215, is owned by a Viet Hoa family. Templer describes 
212 This was a bad move economically. Following the fleeing of the Chinese after 1975, there 
was a notable impact on the economy. 'Coal production slumped, the ports in the north of 
Vietnam ground to a halt for lack of porters. Thousands of traders and craftsmen left.' 
Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.306 
213 Based on the testimony of the Viet Hoa arriving in China. 
214 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.p.304-306 
215 Biti's is primarily a shoemaker and retailer but also has investments in property, factories 
and trade. See www.bitis-vn.com 
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the owners as using 'family ties, business acumen and an appreciation of the 
value of close government connections' to 'get rich.'216 Diasporic Chinese 
have used their money and connections across Asia to move into emerging 
economies like Vietnam, where in exchange for political and financial support 
they are granted monopolies on certain trades. Pye's views on the Chinese 
are particularly apt for explaining this ability to transcend their past, 
Few peoples have gone through such violent travails as the Chinese, 
whose society has been torn by ceaseless wars and revolutions; and 
yet, amazingly, its culture is devoid of any sense of tragedy. Politically 
the Chinese are undaunted optimists. No matter what nightmare they 
have just survived, they are always ready to proclaim that they are on 
the threshold of a new day that it certain to bring miracles of national 
accomplishment. Their capacity for complaining about past 
mistreatment -which can be considerable - suddenly disappears when 
they think of the country's future?17 
Today's Viet Hoa have fought their way to respectability in Vietnam and are 
responsible for much of Vietnam's steadiness. 
5.4 Summary 
Confidence in the Vietnamese leadership had increased since the introduction 
of Doi Moi and freedom for individuals is slowly developing, albeit in fits and 
starts. The more significant matter of economic trust varies. On the one hand, 
the freedom to manage one's land independently has its advantages but the 
216 Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, p.303 
217 Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, p.p.182-183 
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neglect regarding protection of Nuoc Mam risk nullifying the positive aspects. 
Many western governments support their goods producers without overt 
involvement and this would be a positive move for the Vietnamese 
government to take. 
Citizen confidence is clearly being encouraged through the government 
policies that affect the standard of living. The attitude towards disease is that it 
is the responsibility of the government to care for her citizens. While free 
medication is not available for all HIV and AIDS sufferers, compared to other 
Southeast Asian nations, the case of Vietnam is a strong one. 
Employment is a difficult situation to judge. Many who fought for Vietnamese 
independence in the American war feel let down by the lack of centralised job 
provision and those in informal employment are worse off than during the war. 
However, for those in formal employment, there are numerous laws protecting 
their wellbeing. The disparity needs addressing in order for all citizens to 
share confidence in their employment future. 
Citizen confidence in the stability of the country is reflected in the growing 
pride that people take in their homes. Opening of markets has also led to a 
rise in consumption meaning that citizens can enjoy a variety of consumer 
goods. 
The confidence of the Viet Kieu and the Viet Hoa is relatively simple to 
achieve. The removal of the law that requires Viet Kieu to have visa's to return 
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home and the true enforcement of the ban on differing Vietnamese and Viet 
Kieu pricing would hugely increase their confidence in their home country and 
would increase positive feelings which in turn would increase the likelihood of 
the Viet Kieu's return or investment. The Viet Hoa quite simply wish to be left 
alone to live as diasporic Chinese who call Vietnam home. 
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6 : Conclusion 
This thesis set out with the aim of assessing the significance of confidence in 
the development of Vietnam's role as an emerging market economy. 
Confidence was examined under the three categories of external confidence, 
governmental self-confidence and citizen confidence. Confidence within these 
areas has been explored and this chapter lays out the findings of this thesis 
by answering three questions: What would have happened without 
confidence?, how can confidence be improved? and what are the implications 
of confidence? 
6.1 What would have happened without confidence? 
Regarding relationships with other countries and organizations, a lack of 
confidence on the topic of trade would have meant that Vietnam would not 
have moved on from the aftermath of her failure to become the next Asian 
tiger when her markets first opened and investors were hurt by red tape, 
corruption and double-crossing joint venture partners. Instead, she was given 
further opportunity to prove herself and is expanding her economic 
relationships. The confidence in Vietnam is so great that companies such as 
Finley Teas are developing and expanding upon their initial investment. 
As stated earlier, confidence within the context of aid is more complex as by 
its nature, the donor recognizes weakness in the recipient country. In simple 
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terms, aid has gained confidence in its success as demonstrated by donors 
reducing the amounts provided. Less straightforward is the attitude of 
countries such as the US who withdrew aid for reasons such as human rights 
violations. A key part of confidence in aid is the faith that it will be used 
correctly. France had such faith in Vietnam and campaigned for the clearing of 
Vietnamese debt in order to allow the country to move on. Without this 
confidence, Vietnam would have been unable to qualify for the new IMF loans 
that secured her future. 
For much of Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, the greatly significant force of 
ASEAN did not have confidence in Vietnam. This can be attributed to her 
status as a communist nation. It was again French confidence in her former 
colony that led to peace in Indochina. Since then, confidence in Vietnam's 
capacity for dispute resolution has grown and although progress has been 
slow, important developments have been made. Vietnam's signing of the 
"Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea" shows willing 
to settle disputes by internationally approved standards and her overlooking of 
violence to find shared history with South Korea in order to gain peace reflects 
creative ambition in realizing her goal of peace in the region. 
Regarding the Vietnamese government, a lack of confidence in her own 
capabilities would have meant the continuation of pre-Doi Moi attitudes of 
trusting no one, viewing opposition as immoral and maintaining power as 
paramount. Instead, the Vietnamese government has begun to reduce 
socialist ideology and looks instead to new visions of the future that are based 
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more on economic success. Of course, the government still sees control as an 
important aspect of the leadership but the situation has relaxed somewhat. 
Government action largely suggests that confidence has increased. Three 
areas were examined and each would have been different without 
governmental self confidence. Firstly, the government relinquished a certain 
amount of control in allowing industrial parks to have either private or linked 
(to the government) ownership instead of them being government owned and 
controlled. This shows that the government is confident that allowing freer 
enterprise will not damage her power. Secondly, in the early days of 
advertising, the government made some na'ive mistakes in controlling 
campaigns, but this did not damage her confidence and now the decisions 
made are the correct ones. It would be easy for the sophisticated western 
agencies to belittle the Vietnamese but this has not happened. Finally, the 
government has the confidence to tackle the multitude of corporate 
governance issues facing it. Allowing bad practice would be the result if the 
government was not prepared to deal with the situation. 
The government has also faced the great challenge of establishing a new 
relationship with China. Vietnam is the weaker country and the uneven trade 
situation could easily have continued and worsened but the government has 
had the confidence to fight for its rights which led to the two countries signing 
a "Joint Statement on All-round Cooperation in the New Century" which led to 
visits, agreements, exchanged and cooperation. The resolution of the dispute 
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in the Beibu Gulf means that now, the countries are investigating the waters 
for oil, together. 
Had the citizens of Vietnam not had confidence in their government's 
encouragement for whistle-blowing, it is unlikely that they'd have replied to the 
NVL articles. However, this area needs perhaps the most work since the 
government does not allow full freedom of expression. The government also 
allows the price depression that injures rice farmers and the fraudulent Nuoc 
Mam industry to continue. 
Without citizen confidence in the standard of living provided by the 
government they would not be investing in their homes and using banks 
instead of Honda Dream ll's to manage their savings. This is encouraged by 
improvements to the tackling of health issues and to employment law. 
Without Viet Kieu confidence, those individuals would not have returned to 
invest the remittances that are drastically improving the economy. Of course, 
this confidence was enhanced by the 20% reduction in tax and 5% tax on 
profit remittances that the government was offering. Likewise, the Viet Hoa 
would not be establishing their companies in Cholon and across the nation if 
they did not have confidence in Vietnam's markets. 
These points reflect the great significance that confidence has had upon the 
economic development of Vietnam. External confidence has been the most 
important of the three as it has seen the greatest effects. Citizen confidence, 
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by comparison requires the most improving as it is significantly weaker than 
both external confidence and governmental self-confidence. 
6.2 How can confidence be improved? 
To encourage confidence in Vietnam as a trade partner it is important that the 
UEL and CIL are developed through dialogue at the bi-annual business forum. 
Structures such as these laws and a greater crackdown on corruption will 
secure the progress that has been made since the introduction of Doi Moi. It is 
significant that the British Embassy does not yet encourage investment by 
SMEs. This means that Vietnam is closed to a large and potentially very 
lucrative market. Speeding up the contract process and increasing 
transparency will enable that all-important stamp of approval. 
To increase confidence in aid, Vietnam must respond sensibly to Denmark's 
reduction in funds. Her reaction in the past has been one of knee-jerk 
frustration but she is now presented with the opportunity to show donors that 
aid is appreciated and useful. This will encourage the view that Vietnam is 
capable of managing relationships with aid donors and will provide her with 
more justification for future pleas for aid. 
Within the topic of disputes, there is little that Vietnam needs to do to improve 
confidence. By continuing the policies she has adopted, she will maintain the 
confidence that she has built up. However, if the British Embassy is correct in 
fearing that the proposed international arbitration courts for business dispute 
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resolution are a drafting error, then this area will suffer and could lead to a 
decrease in confidence regarding trade. 
Increased governmental self-confidence is something that can only come 
slowly. At present, the government feels that maintaining power needs to be 
an objective rather than something that comes naturally. For a number of 
years after the end of the war, victory was used to legitimize the government. 
As this became less relevant to younger members of society, this was 
replaced by the government aiming for rapid economic success. This has of 
course benefited the country but reflects the fact that the government feels the 
need to convince the population that she ought to be in power. 
The government action discussed in chapter four covered areas where 
confidence is already evident. As a result these are areas where the 
government is already on the right path. However, increased confidence 
would possibly see a more unified approach to the various challenges that the 
government faces and in particular see the creation of a national image that 
could be portrayed to the world. As stated above, this confidence will be slow 
to emerge as it will stem from the success of previous actions, success that 
will encourage the government to reach further. 
Governmental self-confidence when dealing with China has come a long way 
from Vietnam being the ideological little brother of the American war. Initial 
attempts at asserting herself saw the Vietnamese government banning 
Chinese imports but she has since evolved to be a competent diplomatic 
111 
partner. The most important move for Vietnam now is to approach the dispute 
in the Spratly Islands with the same resolution that she took to the dispute 
over Beibu Gulf. China is now far more inclined to work with Vietnam and if 
the government can muster sufficient confidence, she has the opportunity of 
developing an important economic bloc with China. 
Citizen confidence in the Vietnamese government can be improved in two 
ways. Firstly, by allowing freedom of speech, the citizens would have less to 
speak out against. This would break the authoritarian cycle of punishment to 
keep people silent, keeping people silent about punishment. Secondly, the 
government needs to address the economic needs of her people. Controlling 
rice prices many not be necessary if state firms stop buying through the 
intermediaries who alter prices and a look to the copyrighting of Nuoc Mam 
would not only increase confidence in the citizens but would also have 
benefits for the government. 
Confidence could also be increased within the standard of living of the 
Vietnamese people. The continuing of increased health care policies is 
important but the key is addressing the formal/informal employment rights 
disparity. Many citizens in informal employment feel abandoned after risking 
their lives to establish the government. These individuals make up a large 
percentage of the workforce but will not have confidence in the government 
until their needs are met. 
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More than any other topic, Viet Kieu confidence is the easiest to increase. 
Simply by ending the necessity of visas for Viet Kieu and issuing joint-
residence passports, a huge step will be taken. Of course, there are some 
individuals who will never forgive their loss of property in the 1970s but that is 
an issue largely beyond help. Viet Hoa confidence is already high but the 
encouragement of Viet Hoa into politics would make use of their skills while 
recognizing their status as full Vietnamese citizens. 
These points suggest that Vietnam still has a long way to go but that distance 
is arguably less than the journey she has already made. External confidence 
is high and needs maintaining whereas citizen confidence requires a lot of 
work. While this is being done, governmental self-confidence will surely follow. 
6.3 What are the implications of confidence? 
The implications of these findings much be considered within two areas; the 
implications of confidence on theory and the implications of confidence on 
policy. 
The implications of this thesis's findings on theory is that confidence can 
provide a new kind of framework for the examination of economic 
development. Confidence is essentially an emotional response and this soft 
approach to political economy allows it to be viewed in a new kind of light. By 
examining the feelings behind the motivations of external actors, one can 
better suggest actions to meet their perceived requirements which will of 
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course enhance the relationship. By considering the feelings of the 
government in question and looking at how it perceives itself, one can read 
much into why certain policies have been chosen. This could be a useful tool 
when used in conjunction with other frameworks that cannot determine a 
solution. Finally, by assessing the feelings of the citizens of that state one can 
appreciate the motivations of the workforce. This enables one to understand 
why some seemingly good policies (such as the employment laws in Vietnam) 
do not deliver the required response. 
The implications of confidence on policy is that by knowing how a government 
is perceived by external actors and by its citizens it can tailor its policies to 
increase its perception. This is not necessarily something that that 
government would choose to do but it can be helpful as something to be 
considered. 
Ultimately Confidence is about making judgments on the motivations behind 
various actions. The flexibility of the approach is also a limitation in that any 
evidence is largely supposition. By considering confidence as a route to 
economic development, this thesis merely offers one possible interpretation of 
the data and as such can appear simplistic. To truly assess the subject, the 
development of a confidence index that would provide a clear and defendable 
way to measure confidence is necessary. This would be no small undertaking 
but would allow for greater clarity of the factors at play. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Reproduced from the CIA Factbook218 
Country Date of Independence Country granting 
independence 
Indonesia Declared 17th August 1945 Holland 
Recognised 27th December 1949 
Vietnam 2"d September 1945 France 
Myanmar 4th January 1948 Britain 
Laos 19 July 1949 France 
Cambodia 9th November 1953 France 
Malaysia 31 August 1957 Britain 
Singapore 9 August 1965 Malaysian Federation 
Brunai 1st January 1984 Britain 
Appendix2 
From Freeman, 'Promoting Good Corporate Governance Practices in 
Vietnam.' 
The kinds of risks that are prevalent in Vietnam's corporate sector at present, 
for both private and state-owned firms, as a consequence of having 
insufficient CG standards include (but are not limited to): 
218 The CIA, The CIA Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbooklgeos/vm.html, 
Accessed 20th July 2006) 
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i) Loans being given to a related party of the company, at a rate of 
interest that is below the market rate, unsecured by adequate 
collateral, or on terms that do not adequately reflect the level of 
default risk; or conversely 
ii) The company receiving a loan from a related party at a level of 
interest that is markedly higher than market rates; 
iii) Informal commissions being paid to a related party of the company 
on purchases or sales (particularly common in SOEs219); 
iv) Unapproved or fraudulent transfers of the company's assets or cash 
by a senior manager, without the knowledge of the shareholders 
('asset stripping'); 
v) The sale of company assets (or shares) to a related party at prices 
below fair value; or conversely 
vi) The acquisition by the company of assets (or shares) belonging to a 
related party at prices above fair value; 
vii) The sourcing of inputs or services for the company through related 
parties, at prices that are below market value; 
viii) The sale of products or services for the company to related parties 
at prices that are below market value; 
ix) The hiring of family or friends to positions in the company that they 
are unqualified to assume. 220 
219 State Owned Enterprises 
220 Freeman, 'Promoting Good Corporate Governance Practices in Vietnam', p.341 
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